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Carbon pricing has been recognized to be the most efficient means for climate change mitiga-
tion. However, especially in developing countries, there is concern that respective policies 
jeopardize development and disproportionately burden the poorest parts of the population. 
This paper analyzes the distributional impact of an economy-wide carbon tax and fossil fuel 
subsidy reform on households in Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy. Tax revenues and subsidy 
savings are assumed to be invested into basic infrastructure provision. The distribution of tax 
payments as well as of infrastructure access gaps across income groups is estimated by com-
bining an environmentally-extended input-output model with household survey data. While in 
developed countries distributional impacts of carbon pricing have been studied abundantly, 
studies on developing countries using this method are relatively scarce.  In line with previous 
developing country studies, a carbon tax or subsidy reform are found to be progressive in Ni-
geria. Furthermore, access gaps impair primarily rural, lower income households. A compari-
son of total revenues and costs shows, however, that universal infrastructure access provision 
until 2030 is unlikely to be financed solely through carbon pricing. These results suggest that 
a carbon tax recycled into infrastructure not only poses a better targeted means of redistribu-
tion than the existing subsidy regime, but also entails relevant environmental and human de-
velopment benefits.  
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Two defining challenges of this century are overcoming poverty and managing climate change. 
(Stern 2015) 
The alleviation of poverty and the stabilization of the climate are intrinsically intertwined as 
success in rising to one, necessitates success in rising to the other. The impacts of climate 
change are most detrimental to poorer populations in often less resilient developing countries, 
undermining achieved progress in poverty alleviation and development (UN 2015a; IPCC 
2014). However, throughout past decades both in science and in the public debate, the notion 
was widespread that meeting the two challenges was mutually exclusive because mitigating 
climate change was seen as a costly burden and immanently antithetical to development 
(Stern 2015). India's former environment minister Jairam Ramesh most prominently repre-
sented this view when he stated that (what was perceived as) the failure to agree on an inter-
national climate change treaty with binding mitigation targets in 2009 protected the right to 
continued economic growth for the world's emerging economies (ABC News 2009).  
In this spirit, under the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (UNFCCC 1998) only industrialized countries were obliged to reduce their 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. However, global emissions have continued to rise steadily 
despite of the goal stipulated by the UNFCCC (1992) to cap GHG emissions to prevent dan-
gerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. While today's developed countries 
are responsible for the largest share of GHG emissions currently accumulated in the atmos-
phere (IPCC 2014), within the last decade growth in emissions came almost entirely from 
large developing countries (Stavins and Keith 2016). Evidence, for example from China, sug-
gests that successful poverty alleviation and economic development in recently emerging 
economies came along with large-scale burning of fossil fuels, respective carbonization and 
convergence to developed countries' levels of energy demand (Jakob, Haller, and Marschinski 
2012; Steckel et al. 2011). If all developing economies were to follow this path, locking in 
high future emissions through carbon-intensive infrastructure development, climate protection 
would fail (Steckel, Edenhofer, and Jakob 2015; Ottmar Edenhofer et al. 2015). In the 2015 
Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2015) the international community came to terms that the 2 °C 
climate change mitigation goal adopted under the UNFCCC necessitates active participation 
in mitigation efforts of all countries, irrespective of their level of income. Furthermore, the 
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international community of states is increasingly recognizing the potential complementarity 
and positive synergies between climate responsibility, economic development and poverty 
alleviation postulated by Stern (2015). Emphasizing the interdependence of economic, envi-
ronmental and social prosperity, the global agenda of the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) was adopted in 2015 and the concept of green growth has found widespread recogni-
tion (c.f. e.g. OECD 2016; World Bank 2012; UNEP 2011). 
Pursuing the idea of sustainable development, it remains a challenge to define political 
measures which can reconcile economic development with climate change mitigation, particu-
larly on national level in developing countries. Jakob et al. (forthcoming) analyze the potential 
of carbon pricing to finance the closing of infrastructure access gaps on a global level. Moti-
vated by Jakob et al. (forthcoming) and Jakob et al. (2015), this paper examines the interplay 
of the two policy measures, namely a carbon pricing reform coupled with infrastructure de-
velopment, on national level in Nigeria. The paper argues that carbon pricing in the form of a 
subsidy and tax reform would not only induce cost-effective GHG emission reductions in Ni-
geria, but could also contribute to economic and human development as well as, most im-
portantly, to the reduction of inequality by freeing the financial resources necessary to provide 
access to basic infrastructure, including water, sanitation, electricity and telecommunication. 
Based on the case of Nigeria, the analysis specifically focuses on the policies' overall effects 
on income distribution and inequality. 
The analyzed policy mix is expected to make climate change mitigation measures politically 
more attractive, especially in Nigeria, as it links them to the achievement of crucial develop-
ment goals: Carbon pricing in theory is seen as the most efficient policy instrument to miti-
gate climate change, ideally being harmonized across the globe (IPCC 2014). While a harmo-
nized global carbon price is rather unlikely in the near future, there are good reasons for coun-
tries to levy domestic carbon prices, including internalization of domestic climate impacts, co-
benefits, and public finance considerations (Edenhofer et al. 2015). While around 39 national 
jurisdictions had implemented or planned carbon prices between US$ <1 and US$ 130 per ton 
CO2 equivalent (tCO2 e) in 2015 (World Bank 2015a), another 39 countries were subsidizing 
fossil fuel consumption at an average subsidization rate of 38 percent in 2014 - practically 
putting a negative price on carbon (IEA 2015a). While the former are almost entirely high 
income countries (World Bank 2016b), the latter are mostly developing countries who remain, 
as expected, in particular reluctant to raise carbon prices. 
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Revenue recycling into infrastructure development is expected to critically dampen political 
and public contestation of carbon pricing. Apart from the concern that carbon pricing jeopard-
izes overall economic development, its political feasibility has been found to be mainly influ-
enced by the widespread perception of respective policies to be regressive, i.e. to dispropor-
tionally burden the poorest parts of the population (Gevrek and Uyduranoglu 2015). In re-
verse, fossil fuel subsidies are widely considered to be an effective tool for protecting the poor 
and decreasing societal inequality (Arze del Granado, Coady, and Gillingham 2012). This 
paper hypothesizes that investing revenues in the provision of basic infrastructure would spe-
cifically counteract negative distributional effects and compensate lower income households 
for their carbon-price-induced loss of real income because poorer households are typically 
thought of as less likely to have adequate access to infrastructure. Independent of actual dis-
tributional outcomes, public acceptance can also be drastically enhanced by earmarking re-
form revenues for redistributive measures, i.e. by linking them to defined increases in pro-
poor public expenditures (Gevrek and Uyduranoglu 2015; Sælen and Kallbekken 2011). Fur-
thermore, widespread access to basic infrastructure has been determined as a prerequisite for 
sustainable development (Griggs et al. 2013). However, mostly due to insufficient financial 
resources, current levels of infrastructure provision have been identified as sub-optimal and 
infrastructure investments are expected to make up the largest share among all sectoral in-
vestment needs to achieve the SDGs (UNTT 2015). Carbon pricing can serve as promising 
mechanism to yield the necessary additional public revenues (N Stern and Calderon 2014; 
World Bank 2013).  
Finally, the analyzed policy mix seems particularly promising in Nigeria due to the high cur-
rent and projected growth rates of the country’s economy and population. A carbon pricing 
reform coupled with clean infrastructure development might provide an opportunity to pre-
vent locking-in new carbon-intensive infrastructure as well as leaving behind poorer segments 
of society throughout the growth process. In 2014 Nigeria grew to be Africa's largest econo-
my, reaching a GDP of US$ 657 billion in 2015, while its population is projected to grow to 
440 million by 2050 which would make it the world's third most populous country, only be-
hind China and India (D. Coady et al. 2015; PRB 2013; UN 2015b). If no significant mitiga-
tion efforts are undertaken, Nigeria's GHG emissions are expected to double by 2035 (Cer-
vigni, Rogers, and Henrion 2013). Nigeria would then emit around 660 million tons of GHGs 
annually, thus outpacing Germany by 2035 (BMUB 2015). Furthermore, steeply rising energy 
demand, especially in the residential sector, necessitates the rapid expansion of the power 
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sector which is expected to account for the largest share of emission growth in Nigeria, and, 
thus, has the highest mitigation potential (GIZ 2015; Cervigni, Rogers, and Henrion 2013). 
However, necessary public investments have been constrained due to large fiscal deficits. 
Nigeria's public budget is highly vulnerable to volatile global fossil fuel prices due to its large 
resource dependency as well as high expenditures on the existing fossil fuel subsidies. Im-
portantly, in its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) submitted to the UN-
FCCC in 2015, the Nigerian Federal Government signals to be in favor of respective policies 
and acknowledges their co-benefits. It states that ambitious mitigation action is economically 
efficient and socially desirable in Nigeria, even apart from its climate benefits (FME 2015). 
Specifically, it recognizes that "fiscal reform is proving [sic] an efficient mitigation action 
[because it] releases significant resources in the budget that can fund investments in efficient 
infrastructure" (FME 2015). In this spirit, in early 2016, the government partially abolished 
the existing subsidy on kerosene and petrol and efforts have been undertaken to ramp up pub-
lic investment in infrastructure provision (FMF 2011; FMF 2015; Bloomberg 2015). 
Contributing to previous literature in several ways, this paper analyzes the impact on income 
distribution, first, of a carbon pricing reform, second, of infrastructure development and, third, 
of their interplay in Nigeria: First, it estimates the total and relative loss of households' in-
comes as well as the distributional effect of both a potential economy-wide carbon tax as well 
as of a complete subsidy removal. While payments arising from carbon taxation are estimated 
based on households' direct and indirect consumption-based emissions, households' subsidy 
revenues are calculated based only on their direct fuel consumption. Calculations of carbon 
emissions combine data from a 2011 environmentally-extended input-output model with data 
from a 2010/2011 representative household survey in Nigeria. Distributional impacts are es-
timated across rural and urban household quintiles based on per capita income. Secondly, the 
paper analyzes the distributional impact of potential universal infrastructure provision, esti-
mating current access gaps based on qualitative survey questions. Thirdly, it estimates total 
revenues from carbon taxation and total infrastructure investment needs to provide universal 
access by 2030 and compares to what extent the latter could be achieved. For the case of Ni-
geria, these analyses allow insights, first, regarding the overall impact of the policy mix on 
income distribution and inequality and, second, regarding the potential of carbon pricing as 
financing mechanism for sustainable development. Importantly, these analyses contribute to 
the literature as developing country studies on the distributional effect of comprehensive car-
bon pricing, using the described method, are scarce and have not been conducted in Nigeria. 
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Moreover, to the best of knowledge, there are no previous studies analyzing the distributional 
impact and overall potential of carbon pricing in relation with infrastructure development on 
national level. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews relevant literature, sec-
tions 3 provides brief background information on Nigeria. Sections 4 and 5 outline the data, 
describe in detail the underlying calculations of the respective analytical steps and potential 
methodological limitations and present first descriptive results. Section 6 presents the results 
of the analyses, and section 7 provides a discussion of the results and concluding remarks. 
2. Literature Overview 
Centering on the analysis of the distributional effects of the policy mix of carbon pricing cou-
pled with infrastructure development, this study ties in with a wide range of literature analyz-
ing feasible options for national and international climate change mitigation policies at the 
nexus with socio-economic development. An overview of previous literature, first, introduces 
the challenges of mitigation, referring particularly to the development context. After a brief 
review of global commons considerations generally, the prevailing disincentives for unilateral 
emission reductions in developing countries are highlighted specifically, namely the concern 
of impairing overall economic performance as well as slowing down poverty and inequality 
alleviation. Second, evidence from previous studies is presented on how carbon pricing and 
infrastructure investment could overcome specifically these concerns and serve as attractive 
mitigation policy due to positive synergy effects on sustainable economic and human devel-
opment. Finally, the state of the art concerning distributional effects of comprehensive carbon 
taxation, of subsidy reform as well as of infrastructure development is presented in detail and 
how this paper intends to further existing evidence by analyzing the case of Nigeria.  
2.1.  The Problem Statement: Collective Action and Mitigation in the Devel-
opment Context  
Collective action theory or the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968) suggest that due to the 
global public good character of the atmosphere whose use is perfectly non-exclusive and not 
immediately rival climate protection will be supplied at a socially sub-optimal level. The the-
ory suggests that in the absence of a global enforcement mechanism unilateral mitigation ef-
forts do not satisfy countries' self-interest due to expected free-riding (Barrett 2003; Barrett 
1994). Instead of contributing to the long-term globally optimal level of supply, countries 
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have an incentive to pollute and maximize their own short-term benefits, foremost stemming 
from cheap emission-intensive energy supply. Especially regarding large-scale power genera-
tion capacities, fossil fuels still constitute the cheapest source of energy (IPCC 2011) - when 
disregarding their negative climate and environmental externalities, like emissions and air 
pollution. The cost of energy in developing countries would thus increase from mitigation 
measures such as the deployment of low-carbon alternatives, like renewables or nuclear pow-
er, or carbon-tax-induced price changes of fossil resources (Schmidt, Born, and Schneider 
2012). Especially developing countries have been reluctant to voluntarily undertake efforts to 
reduce their emissions, while struggling to supply their rapidly growing energy demand 
(Jakob et al. 2014).  
Two major concerns prevail regarding the adverse impact of climate change mitigation on 
development prospects, first, on overall economic growth and, secondly, on the alleviation of 
poverty and inequality: First, in the past socio-economic development was closely correlated 
with energy demand (Costa, Rybski, and Kropp 2011; Gruebler 2004). Steckel et al. (2013) 
show that no country has succeeded in achieving high income levels without having crossed a 
certain threshold of per capita energy consumption. Also in the last two decades economic 
growth in China and other developing countries came along with a convergence of their ener-
gy demand to that of developed countries (Jakob, Haller, and Marschinski 2012; Steckel et al. 
2011). The move into energy-intensive industry has been identified as a stepping stone to de-
velopment (Galor 2005) and the energy-intensive expansion of physical capital has been 
found to play a crucial role in the growth process (Calderón and Servén 2014; Steckel et al. 
2011; Jan C Minx et al. 2011).
1
 Higher energy prices induced by mitigation efforts result in 
higher prices of capital goods and are thus suspected to crowd out infrastructure investments 
and delay industrialization.  
Second, higher energy prices might not only impede economic growth and thereby impair 
developing countries in lifting their population out of poverty, but also disproportionally bur-
den the poor and increase inequality. In developed countries, most studies on the distribution-
al effects of carbon tax payments find regressive welfare impacts with poorer households 
spending larger shares of their income on energy. For developing countries, empirical evi-
dence is mixed and distributional effects depend strongly on the country-specific context 
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 However, irrespective of the distributional outcome relative to income, any 
additional tax-related payments will compromise the real income of poorer households. Fur-
thermore, higher prices of fossil energy might directly impair individual energy access when 
alternative low-emitting energy sources are also more expensive (Jakob and Steckel 2014). 
Such price changes might trap poorer households in the use of cheap, but emission-intensive 
traditional biomass and jeopardize a key element of any sustainable development strategy, 
namely universal, clean and reliable energy access (Griggs et al. 2013; IPCC 2011).  
Against this theoretical and empirical background, it can be concluded that climate policies 
have to be formulated in a larger sustainability framework, deliberately supporting socio-
economic development and redistributing in favor of the poor. Accordingly, Ostrom (2010) 
states that policies which predominantly serve non-climate-related development objectives, 
but which at the same time result in substantial emission reductions as co-benefits, have the 
biggest chance to be unilaterally implemented and to make a meaningful contribution to cli-
mate mitigation. This basic idea of incentivizing domestic climate protection through a multi-
ple-objective policy framework has found widespread resonance in the international debate in 
concepts like Green Growth and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (World Bank 
2012; UNEP 2011) as well as in research (a.o. Ottmar Edenhofer et al. (2015)).  
2.2.  The Potential of Carbon Pricing and Infrastructure Provision 
This paper suggests that domestic carbon pricing coupled with infrastructure provision can be 
the entry point to a successful multiple-objective policy mix to reconcile change climate miti-
gation and development on national level. This rational is based on a multitude of arguments 
derived from previous literature on this topic. This subsection, first, introduces carbon pricing 
as an efficient mitigation instrument and highlights its potential domestic economic co-
benefits, including the collection of revenues. Second, it outlines the benefits of targeted rev-
enue recycling into infrastructure development: 
From an economic perspective, carbon pricing has been recognized as an important prerequi-
site for cost-effective climate change mitigation (Edenhofer et al. 2015; IPCC 2014). Ideally, 
the price level would be chosen to fully correct social and environmental externalities of car-
bon emissions and, thus, lead to optimal abatement efforts (Pigou 1920). However, even low-
er-than-optimal prices are preferable to none as the idea behind such market-based policy in-
struments is that any price signal will at least partially internalize previous market failures 
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into the decisions of market participants (Edenhofer et al. 2015; L. H. Goulder and Parry 
2008). Often the initial most cost-effective abatement is achieved through fuel switch, energy 
saving and efficiency measures which have a high chance of being incentivized by the price 
signal. This is also the case in Nigeria. Analyzing the Nigerian energy system, Oyedepo 
(2014) defines the inefficient utilization of energy as a major challenge in the country's strug-
gle for adequate supply. Accordingly, investment in energy efficient light bulbs, fuel efficien-
cy, improved kerosene cook stoves, more efficient electrical appliances or the reduction of gas 
flaring among others has been identified to yield abatement at very low or even negative costs 
(Cervigni, Rogers, and Henrion 2013; FME 2010).  
By incentivizing such low-carbon practices, a carbon pricing reform entails not only reduced 
GHG emissions, but also significant domestic co-benefits both on the micro- and the macro-
economic level: First, the mentioned domestic abatement measures substantially reduce do-
mestic social and environmental external costs as they abate not only greenhouse gases and 
their long-term domestic climate impacts, but also other air pollutants, yielding immediate 
local co-benefits for air quality and human health. Based on a survey of 37 previous studies, 
Nemet, Holloway, and Meier (2010) estimate the economic benefits of air quality improve-
ments induced by climate mitigation. They find a range between US$ 2 and US$ 196 per ton 
of abated CO2 across several countries, with the highest co-benefits in developing countries. 
Analyzing the long-term health benefits of mitigation between 2030 and 2100, West et al. 
(2013) find that in several world regions the average marginal co-benefits of avoided mortali-
ty exceed marginal abatement costs by a magnitude of 10 to 70. Further localized benefits of 
reduced fossil fuel use can arise from reduced congestion through reduced travel time, physi-
cal activity and ambient noise (Creutzig, Mühlhoff, and Römer 2012; Duranton and Turner 
2011). Based on an assessment of the ten countries with the highest fuel subsidies, Davis 
(2016) estimates the global external social and health costs of subsidizing fossil fuels at US$ 
44 billion annually. Secondly, apart from foregoing domestic pollution and related external 
costs, subsidy removal or carbon pricing are hoped to directly enhance overall economic per-
formance and growth. By encouraging investment in energy efficiency and renewables, posi-
tive carbon prices are hoped to result in more efficient use of economic resources, increased 
technological innovation, additional employment opportunities and thereby green growth 
(UNEP 2011; OECD 2016). Even though these synergy effects are likely to be smaller than 
expected (Allcott and Greenstone 2012), cost savings from price-induced additional energy 
efficiency measures and increased technology spill-overs among sectors are still expected to 
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enhance overall economic performance (Ottmar Edenhofer et al. 2015; Staub-Kaminski et al. 
2014). 
Apart from these domestic economic co-benefits, importantly carbon pricing and subsidy re-
moval can serve as a direct source of revenue (or savings) and have been identified as a prom-
ising mechanism for post-2015 development finance by the World Bank (2013) and Rietveld 
and van Woudenberg (2005). Subsidy removal has been found to entail large direct and indi-
rect fiscal savings because fossil fuel subsidies are fiscally expensive and economically inef-
ficient. In 2014 direct fossil fuel subsidy spending totaled at around US$ 493 billion
3 
(IEA 
2015a). These fiscal expenditures, however, disregard the indirect economic costs of subsidy 
regimes. As they incentivize overconsumption of fossil fuels, apart from external costs subsi-
dy regimes entail opportunity costs and market inefficiencies (D. Coady et al. 2015). For ex-
ample, large public subsidy payments necessitate expensive higher public debt and higher 
potentially distorting tax burdens. Moreover, they crowd out other productive public spend-
ing, for example on health, education, or infrastructure, and make budgets more vulnerable to 
volatile international energy prices (D. Coady et al. 2015). Davis (2016) estimates global 
2014 subsidy payments to result in economic distortion, i.e. a deadweight loss, of about US$ 
26 billion.
4
 Together with the aforementioned external social costs, total economic costs arise 
to about US$ 70 billion in 2014 (Davis 2016). 
Carbon pricing, on the contrary, can provide an efficient source of public revenue. A price on 
carbon can be implemented either through taxes (price controls) or certificate trading schemes 
(quantity controls) which compare in cost-efficiency depending on the slopes of marginal cost 
and damage curves (Weitzman 1974; L. H. Goulder and Parry 2008; L. Goulder and Pizer 
2006). Taxation of fossil fuels according to their carbon content is understood as an efficient 
source of revenue because taxes on fixed factors of production, such as fossil fuels and other 
natural resources, entail little or no macro-economic distortions (Ramsey 1927). Furthermore, 
upstream carbon taxes which are levied directly on the suppliers of fossil fuels are almost im-
possible to circumvent by market participants. Markandya, González-Eguino, and Escapa 
(2013) found that by broadening the tax base a carbon price can even increase the overall effi-
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 The subsidies considered in this paper are what is referred to as pre-tax subsidies which result in consumer 
energy prices to be below the supply cost of energy. Subsidy payments are calculated as difference between 
the supply cost and actual consumer price. Post-tax subsidies, in contrast, result in consumer energy prices to 
be below the supply cost plus an appropriate Pigouvian tax accounting for the external costs of energy con-
sumption. Subsidy payments are calculated as the difference between the supply cost plus the efficient tax rate 
and the actual consumer price (c.f. Coady et al. 2015; Clements et al. (2013); Pigou 1920).  
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 For the year 2012, (Davis 2014) calculates a larger deadweight loss of US$ 44 billion, due to higher oil prices. 
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ciency of the tax system. This is especially true in economies with a large informal sector 
which is affected by an upstream carbon tax, but would otherwise not be subject to taxation.  
Despite of the described direct and indirect economic, social and environmental benefits of 
carbon pricing reforms, well-targeted revenue spending is indispensable to ensure that the 
resulting increase in energy prices will not slow economic growth and poverty alleviation (O. 
Edenhofer 2015; Jakob and Steckel 2014). Investing all revenues and savings in the provision 
of basic infrastructure is expected to serve this goal and, thereby, increase public acceptance. 
Independent of actual distributional and economic effects, public acceptance can be drastical-
ly enhanced by earmarking reform revenues, i.e. linking them to defined increases in public 
expenditures, as the full social gain from fossil fuel subsidy reform may not be obvious to the 
public (Gevrek and Uyduranoglu 2015; Arze del Granado et al. 2012; Sælen and Kallbekken 
2011). Furthermore, the build-up of physical capital and infrastructure has been found to play 
a crucial role in industrialization and economic performance (Jakob et al. (forthcoming); 
Jakob and Steckel 2014). In a comprehensive review of empirical and theoretical literature, 
(Calderón and Servén 2014) find strong consent regarding the positive effect of infrastructure 
development and income growth. For  example, (Aker and Mbiti 2010) highlight that the dis-
tribution of mobile phones grants widespread access to information and, thereby, enhances 
coordination and market efficiency. According to economic theory, especially in an economy 
like Nigeria where the public budget is predominantly funded by abundant, but exhaustible 
resource rents, the build-up of physical capital stock is important to substitute for the foregone 
natural capital and secure long-term development prospects (Arrow et al. 2004; Hamilton and 
Clemens 1999).  
The expansion of public infrastructure has, furthermore, been recognized to be a prerequisite 
for human well-being and human development which is understood as creating the capabili-
ties for individuals to achieve their personal objectives (Drèze and Sen 2013). A quite exten-
sive body of literature sheds light on different mechanisms through which infrastructure pro-
vision fosters human development, e.g. through wage or employment as well as time savings 
effects or through improved access to education and health, and finds positive connections 
(Calderón and Servén 2014). While universal access to drinking water, sanitation, clean ener-
gy and information is not a sufficient condition, it has been identified as a necessity for reach-
ing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), i.e. achieving poverty alleviation and the 
protection of the Earth's life support system simultaneously (Griggs et al. 2013). Accordingly, 
a recent United Nations report (UNTT 2015) estimates sectoral investment needs for achiev-
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ing the SDGs and finds infrastructure development to constitute the largest share, with global-
ly crudely between US$ 900 and 9,000 billion annually. Finally and most importantly, closing 
infrastructure access gaps is hoped to compensate the potentially regressive welfare impact of 
a carbon pricing reform, be it subsidy removal or carbon taxation. Infrastructure provision is 
hoped to benefit poorer parts of society relatively more because they are more likely to lack 
access. However, information on access share by income groups is yet too limited to draw 
thorough conclusions concerning the impact of infrastructure provision on inequality (Calde-
rón and Servén 2014, 21). Despite of these positive effects of infrastructure development, 
particularly in developing countries with little access to capital markets and potentially insta-
ble institutions, the stock of public infrastructure is below a socially desirable level (Jakob et 
al. (forthcoming)).  
In conclusion, the analyzed policy measures can be expected to be environmentally, economi-
cally and socially beneficial as carbon pricing incentivizes GHG abatement and more efficient 
economic practices while infrastructure expansion supports economic growth and reduces 
social inequalities. Furthermore, the policy mix promises to be institutionally, politically and 
financially feasible (c.f. Jakob et al. 2014) because upstream carbon taxes are relatively easy 
to implement and earmarking carbon revenues raises public acceptance and provides the fi-
nances for infrastructure development. 
2.3.  State of the Art: Distribution of Income Impacts and Nigeria 
This paper contributes to the scientific debate by systematically analyzing the actual distribu-
tional impacts, first, of comprehensive carbon taxation, second, of subsidy removal and, third, 
of closing infrastructure access gaps across income groups in developing countries, based on 
the example of Nigeria. After all, the most common argument of opponents of carbon taxation 
is that poorer segments of society spend a larger share of their income on fuel and energy-
intensive goods and are, therefore, more vulnerable to energy price increases (Gevrek and 
Uyduranoglu 2015; Sælen and Kallbekken 2011). The distributional effect of infrastructure 
provision has found little attention. The study, thus, combines three strands of literature and 
contributes to previous case studies on Nigeria:  
First, the estimation of consumption-based carbon emissions and respective tax payments by 
income group contributes to the literature on carbon footprinting and economy-wide carbon 
taxation. These analyses take into account both direct impacts from fossil fuel combustion and 
12 
indirect impacts from carbon embodied in consumed goods and services.
5
 In developed coun-
tries distributional effects of comprehensive carbon taxes have been studied abundantly. Con-
sensus prevails that tax effects tend to be regressive in high income countries: Combining 
household expenditure with input-output (IO) data, (Wier et al. 2005) find that the CO2 tax in 
Denmark is overall regressive, while the direct impact is more regressive than the indirect. 
Using the same method, Kerkhof et al. (2008) compare a CO2-only with a GHG tax in the 
Netherlands and also find regressivity of both taxes. Using the same method, Feng et al. 
(2010) conclude the same for the United Kingdom. Also for the United States, based on the 
described method Grainger and Kolstad (2010) conclude that a CO2 tax would disproportion-
ally burden the poor based on annual income and that this effect is even more distinct when 
accounting for household size. Rausch et al. (2010), however, who use a Computer-based 
General Equilibrium (CGE) model analyze the effects of carbon pricing through cap-and-
trade and find slight progressivity in the US. Several studies using GCE models, namely Beck 
et al. (2015), Dissou and Siddiqui (2014) and Rausch, Metcalf, and Reilly (2011) using data 
from British Colombia, Canada and the US, point out that the impact of carbon taxation on 
inequality through changes in commodity prices alone may be misleading, highlighting the 
impact of changes in factor prices and respectively in households' income.  
Comparable studies for developing countries cluster around the larger developing countries 
China, India, South Africa and Indonesia. Their conclusions are less homogenous, but point 
toward a progressive effect of carbon taxation in developing countries: One of the first studies 
on this issue referring extensively to developing countries is the case study of Pakistan by 
Shah and Larsen (1992). Based on a partial equilibrium model, they conclude that in low-
income countries carbon taxes are not likely to have such a negative distributional effect as in 
developed countries. Van Heerden et al. (2005) use a static CGE for South Africa to estimate 
the distribution of welfare impacts from a carbon tax when revenues are recycled into food tax 
reductions. For this policy combination they find positive effects for poorer parts of society. 
Devarajan et al. (2011), however, determine a comprehensive carbon tax in South Africa to 
have relatively small, but regressive welfare impacts, mostly due to water and energy con-
sumption. Based on household expenditure and carbon intensity data, Brenner, Riddle, and 
Boyce (2007) find the introduction of carbon charges to be progressive in China, with rich 
households consuming disproportionally more carbon intensive goods. They highlight that 
                                                 
5
 Refer to Appendix A for an overview table of the literature on the direct and indirect distributional impacts of 
carbon pricing which is discussed in this section. 
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their finding is strongly driven by differences between rural and urban households because 
urban households are typically wealthier and exhibit more carbon intensive expenditure pat-
terns. Datta (2010) establishes a partial equilibrium framework to analyze charges on separate 
fossil fuels in India and finds all fuel taxes except the one on kerosene to have neutral or pro-
gressive impacts on income distribution. The study highlights that kerosene is used for cook-
ing and lighting by poorer households who might be incentivized to switch to more carbon-
intensive biomass if kerosene prices were raised (c.f. also IPCC (2011)). Estimating the over-
all economic impact of carbon pricing in Indonesia based on a static CGE, Yusuf (2008) and 
Yusuf and Resosudarmo (2012) conclude that a carbon tax or specific fuel price increases 
would be robustly progressive in rural and neutral or slightly progressive in urban areas, find-
ing rural households to be less sensitive to prices of energy-related commodities. Finally, 
Arze del Granado, Coady, and Gillingham (2012) provide a meta-analysis of previous studies 
undertaken in twenty developing countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin Ameri-
ca
6
 of which most are based on household expenditure data in combination with input-output 
tables. The analysis concludes that overall the total, i.e. direct and indirect, welfare impact of 
increased fuel prices is approximately neutrally distributed. They find that the indirect impact 
makes up as much as 60 percent in African countries of the total impact, indicating that a 
large portion of fuel consumption is for intermediate use. Also, they highlight that while the 
distribution of the direct impact is overall progressive, this finding hides differences among 
fuels, such as the progressivity of gasoline and electricity and the regressivity of kerosene 
price increases. 
Notably, based on this rather comprehensive review of studies analyzing the distribution of 
total, i.e. direct and indirect, consumption-based welfare impacts of carbon taxes (summarized 
in Appendix A), there seems to be a slight methodological divide in the literature: While high-
income country studies often rely on household expenditure data coupled with input-output 
tables, respective developing country studies are mostly based on equilibrium models.
7
 Com-
mon conclusions drawn in the papers are that poorer segments of society in developing coun-
tries consume disproportionally less carbon-intensive goods, resulting in predominant pro-
gressivity of carbon pricing reforms. Furthermore, urban and rural households exhibit differ-
                                                 
6
 Cameroon, Gabon, Central African Republic, Senegal, Ghana, Mali, Congo, Burkina, Madagascar, Bolivia, 
Peru, Honduras, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon; mainly (D. P. Coady et 
al. 2006; Bacon, Bhattacharya, and Kojima 2010) 
7
 Additionally, Seriño and Klasen (2015) use IO and household data to calculate consumption-based carbon 
footprints for households of different income groups in the Philippines. However, they do not calculate the rel-
ative distribution as share of expenditure.  
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ent expenditure patterns and differ in average income levels, resulting in a larger average car-
bon footprint of urban households relative to their (on average higher) total expenditure. Also 
Datta (2010) and Arze del Granado, Coady, and Gillingham (2012) indicate that price in-
creases of different fuels differ in their distributional effects, a point which is further dis-
cussed in the subsequent analysis of literature on fuel-based subsidies and taxes. 
Secondly, the calculation of direct impacts from the removal of the kerosene and gasoline 
subsidies across different income groups in Nigeria adds to fairly comprehensive previous 
research on fuel-specific energy consumption patterns and distributional impacts of specific 
fuel prices, including previous case studies on Nigeria. Again, results differ between devel-
oped and developing countries, but overall reveal more mixed findings regarding the distribu-
tional impact. A recent study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) (Thomas and Flues 2015) provides a comprehensive analysis of distributional 
effects of transport, heating and electricity taxes in 21 OECD countries
8
, based on a micro-
simulation model. While the study emphasizes the heterogeneity of results across countries, 
the unweighted averages of all countries point towards proportional or slightly progressive 
taxes on transport fuels, slightly regressive taxes on heating fuels and clearly regressive elec-
tricity taxes. In comparison, based on household budget surveys, Sterner (2012b) analyzes 
transport fuel taxation in seven European countries and finds regressivity in most of the coun-
tries, emphasizing however that overall welfare impacts are so small that they are practically 
neutral. Sterner (2012a) includes three chapters which analyze fuel tax distribution in the 
United States, two using expenditure and input-output data, the third using an economic mul-
ti-market model for vehicles. They all find taxes to be regressive while the magnitude of this 
distributional impact might depend on the method and could be easily compensated through 
redistributive revenue recycling.  
Among developing countries direct distributional effects are similarly mixed, mostly howev-
er, referring to subsidies instead of taxes. Bacon, Bhattacharya, and Kojima (2010) analyze 
fuel-specific consumption patterns by income quintiles in nine developing countries in Africa 
and Asia,
9
 based on household expenditure survey data. Again heterogeneity in specific fuel 
consumption patterns across countries as well as between rural and urban areas is large. While 
liquefied petroleum gas, gasoline and diesel subsidies show strong average regressive impacts 
                                                 
8
 Austria, Belgium, Chile, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey and 
the United Kingdom 
9
 Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, Thailand, Uganda and Vietnam 
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in all countries, entailing almost no benefit to the poor, kerosene subsidies are progressive in 
three, neutral in two and regressive in four of the nine countries. Bacon, Bhattacharya, and 
Kojima (2010) explain the regressivity even of kerosene which is normally thought of as 
lighting and cooking fuel of the poor by its near perfect substitutability with diesel. Therefore, 
when subsidized kerosene prices are cheaper than diesel, the former is almost universally di-
verted to the transport sector, benefiting higher-income households and businesses. Rao 
(2012) equally finds regressivity of a kerosene subsidy in the state of Maharashtra in India, 
highlighting that it has minimal financial value for poor households in rural areas, while ef-
fects in urban areas were progressive. The study emphasizes that only a small share of total 
subsidy value reaches the households as it is partially diverted as rents along the supply chain 
or lost to the black market, making the subsidy a very inefficient and expensive instrument for 
redistribution irrespective of its distributional effect. Finally, Sterner (2012a) provides anal-
yses of a dozen developing and emerging countries
10
, mostly combining expenditure with 
input-output data. Sterner (2012a) and Sterner (2012b) mainly conclude that in the case of 
transport fuels, both in developed as well as developing countries, tax progressivity tends to 
decline with higher country income levels. In low-income countries, private transport and 
respective fuels tend to be luxury goods and are largely consumed by the rich. 
For Nigeria, one previous study provides a crude assessment of the distribution of direct im-
pacts of subsidy removal on households (Umar and Umar 2013). Also based on household 
survey data, Umar and Umar (2013) divide households in three income groups, comprising 
the lowest and middle 40 percent and the top 20 percent of households. Averaged across all 
households, they find that a 53 percent increase in liter fuel price might decrease household 
income by 3.8 percent.
11
 While the paper does not separately list relative impacts on income 
for each group, its conclusion seems to be that due to higher shares of direct fuel consump-
tion, richer households receive higher subsidy payments relative to income. This finding is in 
line with Soile and Mu (2015) who investigate the distribution of direct impacts from the sub-
sidy regime in Nigeria, calculating Gini coefficients and Lorenz concentration curves based 
on household expenditure data. Relative to income, they find a neutral distribution of kero-
sene subsidy payments and strong regressivity of petrol subsidy payments. Siddig et al. 
(2014) analyze the implications from reduced fuel subsidies on the Nigerian economy as well 
                                                 
10
 among others Chile, China, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Ghana, Iran, India, Kenya, Mexico, Peru, South Africa, 
Tanzania 
11
 (Umar and Umar 2013) do not specify how they arrive at the assumption of a 53 percent fuel price increase. 
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as on poor households, taking into account effects from direct and indirect price changes as 
well as changes in factor prices. In order to study distributional implications, an applied CGE 
is combined with data for 12 types of household from a Nigerian social accounting matrix. 
Siddig et al.( 2014) conclude that even though richer households are more affected in relative 
terms, in terms of real and factor income a subsidy removal entails negative effects for all 
households for which especially poor rural households need to be compensated. Furthermore, 
Nwachukwu and Chike (2011) investigate price elasticity of demand due to fuel subsidy 
changes in Nigeria, finding high demand elasticities and respective subsidy-induced overcon-
sumption. However, they merely analyze patterns of fuel consumption for private vehicles in 
four of the largest Nigerian cities so that their sample is limited to presumably rich and more 
price elastic segments of society. Further case studies focus on Nigeria's energy system and 
inadequate supply, but do not draw detailed conclusions concerning distribution: Ogwumike 
and Ozughalu (2015) investigate the level and determinants of energy poverty in Nigeria, 
based on 2004 household data, and find at least 75 percent of population to suffer from energy 
poverty, mostly due to inferior energy sources like firewood. Analyzing options for sustaina-
ble development of Nigeria's energy system, Oyedepo (2014) concludes that measures to en-
hance energy efficiency and the deployment of decentralized renewable sources are most 
promising to improve Nigeria's inadequate and irregular energy supply. 
Takeaways from previous fuel-specific analyses are that the distribution of income effects 
differs by fuel and depends on the country-specific context. However, in developing coun-
tries, there is a tendency for subsidies on various fuels to be distributed regressively which is 
also assumed to be the case in Nigeria. Furthermore, irrespective of the distributional effect, 
in total the major portion of subsidy payments is tabbed by richer segments of society due to 
their overall higher consumption levels or lost to market inefficiencies. These findings suggest 
that subsidies are a very expensive and inefficient instrument for poverty and inequality alle-
viation. 
Third, the literature concerning infrastructure provision and inequality is rather dispersed. As 
mentioned above, largely, studies on the micro-level impact of infrastructure development 
focus on the mechanisms through which infrastructure provision fosters human development, 
for example through improvement of skills, health and information access (Calderón and Ser-
vén 2014). Concerning the relationship between public spending and distributional outcomes, 
Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2012) model how public growth policies affect inequality depend-
ent on the source of public finance. However, this study does not take stock of the actual ini-
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tial access distribution. Empirical studies which decidedly analyze the actual distribution of 
access to basic infrastructure types among households of different income levels in develop-
ing countries do to the best of knowledge not exist. The World Bank research paper on the 
income distribution and growth effects of infrastructure by Calderón and Servén (2014, 21) 
concludes that due to scarce research, "the limited information available on access and afford-
ability for households at different percentiles of the income distribution represents a major 
obstacle to progress in establishing the consequences of infrastructure development for ine-
quality and, therefore, its overall contribution to poverty reduction."  
This paper adds to previous research methodologically and with regards to content: Using 
high resolution expenditure data combined with input-output tables, this study provides a de-
tailed analysis of total per capita carbon footprints, stemming from direct fuel use as well as 
carbon embodied in consumption goods. Based on these results, the paper provides an addi-
tional developing country analysis of distributional impacts of comprehensive carbon taxation 
which is based on the described method instead of modelling; also it is the first one to analyze 
the distribution of both a tax and subsidy removal in Nigeria, expanding related evidence by 
insights from Africa's largest economy. Furthermore, infrastructure access is determined on 
per capita level, arriving at a precise estimate of investment needs for providing full access 
which adds not least to previous cruder estimates of SDG finance needs. Finally, this study is 
the first to compare overall carbon tax revenues with total infrastructure investment needs on 
national level, both in total as well as in distributional terms. 
3. Background Nigeria 
With a nominal GDP of US$ 657 billion in 2015 and a population of over 170 million, Nige-
ria is the largest economy and most populous nation in Africa (World Bank 2016b). The fed-
eral government's long-term strategy for economic development, Vision 20:2020 (FGN 2010), 
envisages to position Nigeria among the world's 20 largest economies by 2020, with a GDP 
growth target of US$ 900 billion. Rapid expansion and diversification in the private non-oil 
sectors is expected to be the main driver of socio-economic transformation and employment 
creation in order to achieve declining economic and fiscal importance of the mining sector in 
relative terms. The Vision and the 2011-2015 Transformation Agenda (FGN 2011) call for 
significant investment in basic physical infrastructure, with a focus on electricity generation 
and distribution. Also, they call for reforms to shift investment to increase private-sector ac-
tivities and productivity of human capital as well as for anti-corruption and good governance 
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measures. The respective expansion of energy access, road transport, petroleum refining ca-
pacities, but also higher standards of living of a growing population, e.g. by private car own-
ership, could imply more than a doubling of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2035 in a 
business-as-usual (BAU) scenario (FME 2015; Cervigni, Rogers, and Henrion 2013, 1).
12
 To 
forego large negative environment and climate impacts and a lock-in of high future emissions 
through the construction of carbon-intensive infrastructure, it is crucial to take early steps 
toward sustainable development in Nigeria. In this spirit, the government intends a 20 percent 
emission reduction below the BAU scenario, or 45 percent with international financial and 
technical support, by 2030 (FME 2015; Buhari H.E. 2015).  
In order to meet these envisaged sustainable human and economic development goals, large 
social, economic, and fiscal challenges have to be overcome: First, high social inequality and 
low human capacities, second, the economic dependency from the petroleum sector as well 
as, third, the fiscally expensive fossil fuel subsidy regime and large wage bills from public 
sector employment. In order to tackle those challenges, in recent years the Nigerian govern-
ment pursued reform efforts which are broadly in line with the policy measures analyzed in 
this paper: First, the government partially reformed the fossil fuel subsidy regime, second, it 
broadened the tax collection and improved fiscal consolidation and, third, it identified the 
provision of efficient infrastructure as highest priority sector for public investments. This 
chapter introduces the remaining challenges before outlining the three recent reform efforts 
and how they align with the policy instruments analyzed in this paper.  
Social Challenges 
The Nigerian government is facing fundamental shortcomings in the country’s human devel-
opment and good governance practices. In 2015 peaceful and transparent elections were held 
which were deemed largely free and fair by international and regional observers (CIA 2016). 
Despite of rather stable political conditions and robust economic growth, social inequalities 
increased throughout the past decade, both between rural and urban areas as well as between 
Nigeria's six geopolitical regions (Barungi, Ogunleye, and Zamba 2015). The World Bank 
classifies Nigeria as lower middle-income country and 53 percent of the population lived be-
low the poverty line of US$ 1.90 a day in 2009 (World Bank 2016b). With its Human Devel-
                                                 
12
 In its business-as-usual GHG emissions scenario, the Federal Ministry of Environment expects a 114 percent 
increase of emissions between 2015 and 2030, assuming an annual economic growth of 5 percent, population 
growth of 2.5 percent, universal (on-grid and off-grid) electricity access and supply as well as a tripling of in-
dustrial activity until 2030 (FME 2015). 
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opment Index ranking 152nd globally in 2014, it remains a low human development country 
(UNDP 2016). Furthermore, recent insurgency by the militant group Boko Haram poses a 
serious security threat and caused a humanitarian crisis in the north-eastern region, internally 
displacing 2 million individuals since 2013 (IOM 2015). Generally, the government has been 
struggling to improve low levels of institutional and human capacities, regulatory inefficien-
cies and high levels of corruption (CPI 2016; IMF 2013b).  
Economic Challenges 
Apart from meeting social challenges, Nigeria is struggling for macro-economic consolida-
tion. Nigeria is Africa's largest oil producer, seventh largest in the Organization of the Petro-
leum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and was the world's fourth largest exporter of liquefied 
natural gas in 2012. Large remaining reserves guarantee another 50 years of extraction (GIZ 
2015). Throughout the past decade, the Nigerian economy grew steadily between 5 percent 
and 7 percent annually (Barungi, Ogunleye, and Zamba 2015). Importantly, in recent years, 
the non-oil sector was the main driver of GDP growth, with services contributing around 57 
percent, manufacturing 9 percent and agriculture 21 percent of GDP in 2013. Between 2009 
and 2013 the mining and quarry sector (including oil and gas) declined in relative economic 
importance from 30 percent to 13 percent of GDP. Despite of increasing economic diversifi-
cation, however, oil revenues still accounted for 90 percent of total export earnings and for 
over 70 percent of government income, making fiscal consolidation highly vulnerable to vola-
tile global oil prices. The public budget is further tightened as oil production falls below ex-
pected rates due to extensive oil theft and pipeline sabotage, while in the gas sector the short-
fall of adequate infrastructure restricts the monetization of large amounts of - presently flared 
- gas (IISD 2012; GIZ 2015). Oil price volatility also affects the domestic economy because 
despite of extensive crude oil exports about 85 percent of domestic demand for refined petro-
leum products is supplied by imports. Due to poor maintenance and mismanagement only 30 
percent of the capacity of domestic refineries is used (GIZ 2015).  
Fiscal Challenges 
Apart from decreasing oil revenues and poor public spending practices (IMF 2013b), two 
large fixed public expenditure items crowd out investment in critical public services in Nige-
ria: First, one of the main fiscal stressors and reason for high budget deficits is the existing 
subsidy regime which is also subject to global oil price changes (FMF 2011). Established in 
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the 1960s, the system administratively sets fixed kerosene and petrol prices. The Petroleum 
Support Fund (PSF) was established to finance the difference when imported parity prices are 
higher than the fixed price levels and to collect the revenues when import prices are lower 
(IMF 2013). However, due to high oil prices since 2009 the PSF hardly received payments, 
while subsidy costs rose to 4.7 percent of GDP in 2011 (IMF 2013). While only US$ 1.7 bil-
lion had been appropriated in the 2011 budget, actual payments totaled at US$ 5.3 billion 
(FMF 2012). While this budget gap is mostly due to the unpredictable nature of volatile glob-
al oil prices, the subsidized price difference has also encouraged widespread smuggling to 
neighboring countries and other fraud, like inflated consumption figures and landing costs 
(IISD 2012; Whitley and van der Burg 2015). For example, US$ 1.6 billion of subsidy paid to 
marketers in 2011 were not supplied. While 59 million liters of fuel a day were subsidized, 
only 35 million liters a day were actually consumed in Nigeria in 2011 (Siddig et al. 2014).  
Second, apart from the subsidy regime, another main fixed expenditure item and reason for 
large budget deficits is the large wage bill (FMF 2011). In the 2013 budget, personnel costs 
accounted for more than a third of total spending (FMF 2015). Despite of increasing econom-
ic diversification, the public sector is still the largest employer of formal labor in Nigeria. 
While the rate of unemployment reached 9.9 percent in the third quarter of 2015 (Ventures 
Africa 2015), private sector development faces major challenges. The existing gap of, in par-
ticular physical, infrastructure has been identified as a main obstacle (World Bank 2016a; 
FMF 2015; FMF 2011). Especially, the supply of energy is insufficient and unreliable which 
causes large costs to private businesses (Aliyu, Ramli, and Saleh 2013). Due to the low level 
of on-grid electrification as well as frequent blackouts, the majority of Nigerian businesses 
and households relies on alternate power sources, to the largest part solid biomass and fuel 
generators (see Excursus: The Role of Firewood and Household Energy Consumption). In 
2013 about 80 percent of the population was experiencing poor power supply and 85 percent 
of Nigerian businesses and manufacturers rely on private fuel generators, spending on average 
NGN 3.5 trillion (US$ 23.5 billion) per year on their operation and maintenance (GIZ 2015; 
Aliyu, Ramli, and Saleh 2013). Overall in 2011 60 million private power generators were in 
operation, which is one for every 2.5 individuals (GIZ 2015).  
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Excursus: The Role of Firewood and Household Energy Consumption 
Solid biofuels accounted for over 80 percent of 
Nigeria's energy consumption in 2013, of which 
7 percent was used by industry and over 90 per-
cent were used by households. Furthermore, the 
residential sector accounted for over 80 percent 
of final energy demand in Nigeria in 2013 (IEA 
2015b). GIZ (2015) estimates the average per 
capita consumption of fuel wood to be 2.5 m
3 
annually. Predominantly, firewood is burned for 
cooking purposes as more than 65 percent of households rely on it as their main cooking fuel 
(own calculation based on NBS 2011), mostly using open fires which have very low thermal 
efficiency and result in high indoor air pollution (Ogwumike and Ozughalu 2015). Especially 
in view of Nigeria's fast growing population, expected to be the world's third most populous 
country in 2050 with around 440 million inhabitants (PRB 2013), such energy consumption 
practices can entail large negative impacts on the environment and health. Importantly, over 
90 percent of used firewood is acquired without purchase so that market-based regulation, e.g. 
through a tax, is impossible (own calculation based on NBS 2011). Per capita firewood use is 
especially high in rural areas and first rises, then declines with rising income (Fig. 1). In order 
to induce reduced use of firewood, it is necessary to provide universal adequate and afforda-
ble access to modern environmentally-friendly sources of energy (Ogwumike, Ozughalu, and 
Abiona 2014). 
Reform Efforts 
Drawing conclusions from these diverse challenges, in recent budget reports and medium-
term expenditure frameworks the Nigerian government has acknowledged political reforms 
which could serve as legislative framework for the policy mix analyzed in this paper (FMF 
2012; FMF 2015): First, the partial reform of the subsidy system, second, the broadening and 
reform of the tax system and, third, the prioritization of public infrastructure investments.  
First, in recent years the Nigerian government launched several attempts to reform the subsidy 
regime. On 1 January 2012 the petrol price was fully deregulated while the pegged kerosene 
price of NGN 50 (US$ 0.34) per liter stayed unchanged. Consequently, the liter price of petrol 

























per household per capita
Fig. 1: Value of used firewood, in 2011 US$ per 
household and capita, in Nigeria in 2011. 
Source: own calculation based on NBS (2011) 
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NGN 141 (Whitley and van der Burg 2015). Preceding the reform, the government launched a 
campaign for the Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Program (SURE-P) to mitigate 
the impact of removing the subsidy on the poor. The Program promoted pro-poor investments 
in human capital and public infrastructure development, including road and railway networks, 
mass transit, as well as health and education facilities and vocational training (IMF 2013a). 
Despite the initiative, public opposition to the subsidy removal was extensive and prompt 
(Akinyemi et al. 2014). A national strike launched by two large trade union federations result-
ed in violence and a near state of emergency, prompting the president to announce on 15 Jan-
uary that the reform would partially be reversed, fixing a new petrol price at NGN 97 (US$ 
0.65) (IMF 2013a). Preceding the elections in 2015, the Petroleum Ministry reduced the petrol 
price again to NGN 87, supposedly due to the reduction in international crude oil prices (Pre-
mium Times Nigeria 2015). Finally, in January 2016, the new government abolished the PSF 
and reformed both subsidies. The petrol price was fully deregulated and fell to the import 
price of NGN 85 per liter. The kerosene subsidy is planned to be continued at least until 2017. 
However, the pegged price was increased to NGN 83 per liter which is above the kerosene 
import price at January 2016 oil prices (FMF 2015; Bloomberg 2015).  
Second, the Nigerian government is actively exploring alternative sources of revenue, focus-
ing on broadening the tax system, in order to achieve fiscal consolidation and to return to a 
fiscal deficit below 3 percent of GDP, instead of 20 percent of GDP in 2012 (IMF 2013b, 20; 
FMF 2011, 8). Budget consolidation is especially challenging in the face of currently low oil 
prices and respectively low revenues. Reform efforts focus on measures to increase revenues 
from the non-oil sector and higher income groups while reducing the tax burden for private 
businesses (Barungi, Ogunleye, and Zamba 2015). The 2015-17 Medium Term Expenditure 
Framework introduces a surcharge on luxury goods and cuts in recurrent payments. While not 
explicitly referring to carbon taxation, Nigeria's INDC mentions fiscal reform as efficient tool 
in the context of climate mitigation. Furthermore, the INDC states that fiscal reform "releases 
significant resources in the budget that can fund investments in efficient infrastructure and 
other fiscal policies, thus creating jobs and fueling growth" (FME 2015, 9). On international 
level under the UNFCCC, the Nigerian government also calls for transparent and accessible 
financial resources from developed countries to support mitigation and adaptation activities in 
developing countries and to ensure equitable access to sustainable development (Buhari H.E. 
2015). 
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Third, in recent expenditure frameworks and policy strategies, the provision of basic physical  
infrastructure has been identified as highest priority in public spending (FMF 2011; FGN 
2011; FMF 2012; FMF 2015). In the 2011 budget, the majority of capital expenditures, 43 
percent, was devoted to closing the existing infrastructure gap, recognizing that "poor infra-
structure has for long been an impediment to the growth of the non-oil sector" (FMF 2012, 
57). Between 2015 and 2017, US$ 2 billion of public funds are devoted to infrastructure de-
velopment and rehabilitation (Barungi, Ogunleye, and Zamba 2015). Emphasis is placed on 
power, transport, oil and gas infrastructure as well as on housing and water resources (FMF 
2015). Specifically, the Nigerian government plans to achieve an electrification rate of 75 
percent and triple the transmission capacity by 2025 (FGN 2010). Current energy supply is 
irregular and inadequate to meet the high and rising energy demand (Oyedepo 2014; Aliyu, 
Ramli, and Saleh 2013; Olaseni and Alade 2012). Cervigni, Rogers, and Henrion (2013) esti-
mate that in order to sustain the aspired high pace of growth, until 2030 electricity generation 
would have to increase by a factor of 9. Importantly, the power and petroleum sector have the 
highest GHG emission reduction potentials (FME 2015). Efficiency improvements, such as 
efficient lighting (both on-grid and off-grid), fuel efficiency and halting gas flaring, as well as 
expansion of renewables, such as off-grid solar and hydro power, are expected to yield large 
emission reductions at negative cost, i.e. resulting in economic gains in Nigeria (FME 2010; 
Oyedepo 2014; Cervigni, Rogers, and Henrion 2013). The 2012-2017 Multi-Year Tariff Or-
der specifies concrete feed-in tariff rates for onshore wind, solar, small hydro and biomass 
energy. Furthermore, the 2011 Renewable Energy Plan intends to increase the share of renew-
able electricity generation capacity from 13 percent in 2015 to 36 percent in 2030 to meet 
Nigeria's growing demand. Finally, an early-2016 tariff order obliges electricity distribution 
companies to source at least 50 percent of their procurement from renewables (IEA 2016). 
Without those and further political intervention, generation capacity from gas is expected to 
grow most in terms of total capacity and capacity from coal will be added to the mix (GIZ 
2015).  
Concluding from this overview, large human and economic development challenges remain to 
be solved in Nigeria. Furthermore, increasing GHG emissions due to high economic and pop-
ulation growth rates entail great climate change mitigation potential. In recent years, the Nige-
rian government has launched political reforms which are compatible with the policy mix 
analyzed in this paper, namely carbon pricing reform and infrastructure development. Also 
particularly in the energy sector first policy initiatives lead the way to clean, sustainable de-
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velopment. However, to achieve low-carbon and socially inclusive development further polit-
ical guidance and more efficient implementation of currently broadly framed policy strategies 
are indispensable.  
4. Data 
Data on household consumption expenditures in Nigeria are taken from a 2010/2011 general 
household survey conducted jointly by the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and 
the Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) Program of the World Bank (NBS 2011). 
The survey is carried out biannually every two years, comprising a randomly selected repre-
sentative sample of 5,000 households. Weights for each household allow for the results to be 
extrapolated to the total Nigerian population. The survey comprises household expenditure 
data as well as data on the households' socio-demographic characteristics and dwelling attrib-
utes.  
The household consumption expenditure schedule used for the survey collects information on 
170 goods and services with different reference periods of 7 days, one month or 6 months 
preceding the interview date. The survey collects biannual data during the post-planting (Au-
gust to October) and post-harvest (February to April) season. In order to estimate total annual 
expenditures on each item, data from the different reference periods are extrapolated to half a 
year for each season. Data from both survey rounds are summed to cover the whole year. 
Qualitative questions in the survey on the type of water source, the type of latrine, the source 
of electricity, if any, and phone use by households are used to estimate average infrastructure 
access shares among income groups. 
In addition to the detailed raw data of household expenditures, the LSMS survey specially 
features a separate dataset comprising aggregate per capita and household expenditure data 
which are temporally and regionally deflated and, therefore, provide a robust basis for the 
division of households into income groups. As a basis for the subsequent analysis of distribu-
tional effects, ten income groups are formed, dividing Nigerian households into rural and ur-
ban areas as well as income quintiles. The division in rural and urban parts of the population 
prevents blurring potential general differences in socio-economic characteristics as well as 
energy use and consumption patterns. Households are then divided into weighted quintiles 
based on their average aggregate annual per capita expenditures. Consistent with most studies 
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using household data annual per capita expenditures are used as proxy for income levels (c.f. 
Kerkhof, Nonhebel, and Moll 2009; Feng et al. 2010).  
 min max mean size pop share 
R1 125 641 494 7 15.80% 
R2 641 878 760 7 14.52% 
R3 880 1,175 1,012 6 13.10% 
R4 1,176 1,675 1,393 5 11.38% 
R5 1,675 10,421 2,639 4 8.55% 
U1 212 1,030 782 6 9.51% 
U2 1,034 1,484 1,267 6 8.31% 
U3 1,484 2,006 1,735 5 7.34% 
U4 2,008 2,757 2,356 5 6.60% 
U5 2,769 16,776 4,127 3 4.88% 
Tab. 1: Annual per capita income in PPP-adjusted 2011 US$ (minimum, maximum and mean), average 
household size and percentage share of total population, by rural (R1-5) and urban (U1-5) house-
hold quintiles. Note: income levels increase with increasing numbers R/U 1 to 5. 
The distribution of average per capita income and household size across the ten income 
groups, shown in Tab. 1, indeed exhibits general socio-economic differences between rural 
and urban households. On average, rural households are less wealthy. The minimum capita 
income in the highest rural quintile R5 is approximately level with the mean income of the 
third urban quintile U3 and the mean of the second rural group R2 is still smaller than that of 
the bottom urban quintile U1. The large income interval in both the rural and urban richest 
quintiles, R5 and U5, indicates the existence of a small super-rich upper class in Nigeria. Fur-
thermore, rural households are on average larger in capita size than urban households, ranging 
from 7 to 4 (R1-5) and 6 to 3 (U1-5) respectively. Notably, while quintiles in both groups 
hold equal numbers of households, the distribution of household sizes among quintiles entails 
that on per capita basis the lower quintiles are much larger and represent a greater share of the 
total population (c.f. column 'pop share').
13
 Overall rural quintiles capture 63 percent
14
, urban 
only 37 percent of the population. 
Further modification of the dataset was necessary due to incomplete or inaccurate observa-
tions: Observations were completely excluded only when households could not be attributed 
to an income group (due to missing aggregate expenditure or rural-urban data), but not when 
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 The LSMS survey is carried out on a household basis - with the smallest unit of observation being households, 
so that the level of detail in the collected information does not allow for dividing the population in capita-
based quintiles. 
14
 The World Bank finds a slightly smaller percentage of rural population in 2011 of 56 percent (World Bank 
2016b) while Siddig et al. (2014) list 70 percent of rural population.  
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single values on expense items were missing. As all analyses in this study are averaged over 
the income groups, single missing observations are not expected to distort the results, as long 
as they are carefully excluded from drawing the averages. Outliers were detected as values 
larger than the largest 0.01 percentile of each variable and replaced by the mean of the income 
group of the affected household and variable. Finally, around 4,800 household observations 
were used in the analysis. 
Information on carbon intensities of each sector are calculated for the year 2011 based on the 
environmentally-extended multi-regional input-output (MRIO) tables provided by the Global 
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP 9; Narayanan et al. 2015) which traces the interdependencies 
of 57 sectors in 140 regions globally. For each sector, the model allows to trace the average 
tons of CO2 emissions per 2011 US$ of all its products, taking account of the energy com-
modities and inputs used in the production.
15
 The purchasing power parity conversion factor 
for 2011 provided by the World Bank is used to convert carbon intensities from tCO2 per US$ 
to tCO2 per NGN in order to make them compatible with Nigerian expenditure survey data. 
Based on this information, the respective carbon-tax-induced price changes and impacts of a 
fossil fuel subsidy reform can be calculated for all 57 sectors.  
GTAP Sectors (9.0, 2011) 
 















Household Carbon Footprint 
per Category 
- CO2 Rice 
- CO2 Maize 
- CO2 Public transport 
- CO2… 
57 sectors 
Carbon intensity  
(tCO2/ NGN) 
170 consumption items 
Household expenditure 
(NGN) 
CF from 150 consumed items 
Household Carbon Footprint  
(tCO2) 
Fig. 1: Matching of Sectors in the MRIO with Disaggregated Household Consumption Items from the 
Household Survey 
Finally, household expenditure data are matched with the carbon intensity MRIO data, i.e. all 
170 disaggregated consumption items covered in the household survey are assigned to the 
corresponding 57 MRIO sectors, following convergence tables provided by GTAP (c.f. Seriño 
and Klasen 2015). Finally, 150 disaggregated consumption items are matched to 28 GTAP 
sectors following the procedure depicted in Fig. 1.
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  Some items, mostly services, were not 
matchable and the remaining 29 sectors’ output does not comprise end-consumer products. 
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 The MRIO data do not include non-energy related sources of GHG emissions, such as methane emissions 
from land use change. The carbon tax referred to in this paper is, therefore, a CO2 tax. 
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Therefore, these sectors are not directly included, even though implicitly their carbon-
intensity is taken into account as inputs to the other sectors. 
5. Method  
The overall distributional impact of a carbon pricing reform coupled with closing infrastruc-
ture access gaps in Nigeria is estimated in four steps. Total tax revenues and investment needs 
until 2030 are compared in a fifth step, followed by a comprehensive discussion of methodo-
logical limitations: First, the direct and indirect price changes of different product categories 
after taxation are calculated. The price increases of consumer goods depend on their respec-
tive carbon intensities, i.e. carbon contents per monetary unit, which are estimated using an 
environmentally-extended MRIO analysis. Second, the distribution of the direct and indirect 
welfare impact of the carbon tax is assessed for households of different income quintiles, 
based on household survey data. The income impacts depend on the price changes as well as 
the expenditure shares of each product, averaged per household group. Third, the direct wel-
fare impact of a complete removal of the existing kerosene and petrol subsidies is estimated 
using the difference between the subsidized domestic price and global retail price per liter for 
both fuels as well as annual expenditures. Fourth, the per capita cost of granting access to the 
four types of basic infrastructure is estimated based on different sources and the distribution 
and total extent of infrastructure access gaps are calculated based on qualitative household 
survey data. Sixth, total tax revenues until 2030 are calculated for three different tax rates and 
compared to total infrastructure costs for a margin of cost assumptions in a sensitivity analy-
sis. Finally, methodological limitations of all calculations are discussed comprehensively.
17
  
5.1. Direct and Indirect Price Changes  
When a comprehensive carbon tax is imposed on commodities in Nigeria, prices of consumer 
products will change. In the short-term, these price changes depend mainly on carbon intensi-
ties, i.e. the amount of carbon emitted per monetary unit of each product. Carbon emissions 
can be classified as direct and indirect emissions. Direct emissions originate from the direct 
consumption of energy, e.g. from fossil fuel combustion for cooking, heating, lighting, and 
private transport. Respective tax payments are born directly by consumers purchasing the en-
ergy commodity. Indirect emissions are generated during the production process and waste 
treatment of consumed goods and services. Taxes for indirect emissions are imposed on pro-
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 A digital appendix (described in Appendix D) contains all calculations and raw data underlying this study. 
28 
ducers. In accordance with previous studies, it is assumed that producers pass these respective 
increases in energy production costs fully forward onto the domestic prices of goods and ser-
vices (Arze del Granado, Coady, and Gillingham 2012; Feng et al. 2010; Kerkhof, Nonhebel, 
and Moll 2009; Kerkhof et al. 2008; Wier et al. 2005). Therefore, in this study tax payments 
for both direct and indirect emissions are expected to be borne by the end consumer, even 
though, in the long-run, producers may partially absorb the price increases due to substitution 
or efficiency measures. Consequently, the total price change of goods in consumption catego-
ry or sector k, ∆𝑝𝑘
𝑡𝑜𝑡, is the sum of direct and indirect price changes: 
∆𝑝𝑘
𝑡𝑜𝑡 =  ∆𝑝𝑘




𝑑𝑖𝑟 is the direct price change of product category k and ∆𝑝𝑘
𝑖𝑛𝑑 is the indirect price 
change of product category k, both in US$ of tax payment per US$ of product value. The 
price changes of consumption category k are the result of taxation of direct and indirect car-
bon emissions, as shown in Eq. ( 2) 
∆𝑝𝑘
𝑑𝑖𝑟 = 𝑒𝑘
𝑑𝑖𝑟 ∗ 𝑡                                             ∆𝑝𝑘
𝑖𝑛𝑑 = 𝑒𝑘




𝑖𝑛𝑑 represent the average direct and indirect carbon emission intensities of 
product category k, measured in tons of CO2 emitted per US$ of product value, and 𝑡 is the tax 
rate, in US$ per ton of CO2.  
Both direct and indirect carbon intensities, 𝑒𝑘
𝑑𝑖𝑟 and 𝑒𝑘
𝑖𝑛𝑑, are quantified based on the MRIO. 
The MRIO analytical framework serves to determine the interdependencies of all sectors in an 
economy and between economies. Based on information on the production structure of indus-
tries, input-output tables present the production of an economy depending on intersectoral 
relations and final demand. The basic structure of MRIO can be written as follows:  
𝑋 = (𝐼 − 𝐴)−1 ∗ 𝑌 
( 3) 
where X is the total production output matrix. The (𝐼 − 𝐴)−1 matrix is referred to as the Leon-
tief inverse, (c.f. Leontief 1986), and represents the total production of each sector required to 
satisfy a particular final demand in the economy. Respectively, 𝐴 is a matrix of technical co-
efficients based on intersectoral commodity flows, i.e. connecting the output of each sector to 
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its inputs from other sectors, 𝐼 is the identity matrix and Y is the vector of final demand.18 The 
environmental extension of MRIO allows relating carbon intensities to monetary flows in the 
input-output tables. For each product category, the model allows to trace the average carbon 
emissions associated with each monetary unit, taking account of the energy commodities, 
coal, crude oil, natural gas, petroleum products, electricity, and gas distribution (GTAP 2008), 
and inputs used in the production. Accordingly, the emission intensities of each product cate-
gory or sector k are calculated as follows: 
𝑒𝑘
𝑑𝑖𝑟/𝑖𝑛𝑑
= 𝑐(𝐼 − 𝐴)−1 ∗ 𝑌 
( 4) 
where c is a vector assigning a carbon coefficient to each sector of the economy. The coeffi-
cients are a result of several factors, including sectoral fuel consumption, energy conversion 
coefficients as well as emission factors of commodities, and the ratio of carbon stored as well 
as the fraction of carbon oxidized of energy commodities (GTAP 2008). Notably, most previ-
ous studies use MRIO only for the assessment of indirect price changes of goods and services 
and calculate direct price changes separately for each fuel type, based on their respective car-
bon content. In this study, however, this method is not feasible because reliable information 
on actual domestic retail prices per quantity of fossil resource is not readily available for the 
Nigerian market which makes it impossible to convert from expenditures to quantities con-
sumed to embodied emissions (IISD 2012). Therefore, the averaged emission intensities of 
the energy and commodity sectors provided in the MRIO are expected to provide a feasible 
approximation.  
5.2. Carbon Tax: Total Payments and Distribution of Income Impacts 
The magnitude of the welfare impacts and their distribution across income groups depend 
both on the carbon intensity of consumption items as well as on their relative importance 
within the average consumption basket of each group. The distribution of the welfare impact 
of a tax is referred to as progressive if the relative welfare loss increases with household in-
come. For example, when higher-income households spend relatively more money on carbon-
intensive products, like petrol and electricity, than lower income groups, their tax burden ac-
counts for a higher percentage share in their total income and the tax is progressive (Arze del 
Granado, Coady, and Gillingham 2012). 
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  For further details on MRIO refer to J.C. Minx et al. (2009). 
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The amount of tax payments by specific households is a result of the carbon content related 
price increase of different consumption items as well as the level of expenditure on these 
items. Accordingly, the total tax payments, d, of income group q are calculated as: 
𝑑𝑞 =  ∑ ∆𝑝𝑘





𝑡𝑜𝑡 is the total price change of product category k and  𝑖𝑘𝑞 is the total annual ex-
penditure of household group q on consumption items in product category k. The relative in-
come impact is obtained by dividing this total income impact by the total expenditures of the 
household. Both results are averaged across each income group. Because the tax level t, used 
in the price change calculation, is subject to later sensitivity analyses, as an intermediate step, 
the carbon footprint, CF, of household consumption of income group q is calculated by multi-
plying the carbon intensities with household expenditures for all consumption categories K: 
𝐶𝐹𝑞 =  (𝑒𝐾
𝑑𝑖𝑟 + 𝑒𝐾
𝑖𝑛𝑑)  ∗ 𝑖𝐾𝑞  
( 6) 
For this calculation the direct and indirect emissions 𝑒𝐾
𝑑𝑖𝑟 and 𝑒𝐾
𝑖𝑛𝑑 are converted from 
tCO2/US$ to tCO2/NGN to be compatible with household expenditure data i Kq, using the 
purchasing power parity conversion factor for Nigeria (World Bank 2016b). Furthermore, for 
this calculation household expenditure data are matched with the carbon intensity MRIO data 
(c.f. Section 4).  
5.3. Kerosene and Petrol Subsidies: Total Payments and Distribution of In-
come Impacts 
The total and relative income impacts as well as their distribution of the existing kerosene and 
petrol subsidies in Nigeria are calculated separately because the environmentally extended 
MRIO does not serve to calculate fuel-specific price increases because all fossil fuels are ag-
gregated into one sector. Consequently, this study can only shed light on the direct welfare 
impact, i.e. the subsidy impact on households from direct purchase and consumption of kero-
sene and petrol. 
(2011 NGN/liter) Spot Price Official retail price Subsidy payment 
Kerosene 116.46 65.00 77.53 
Petrol  122.38 50.00 99.63 
Tab. 2: Kerosene and petrol spot price, retail price and subsidy in Nigeria in 2011 (in 2011 NGN/liter). 
Note: Subsidy payments per liter are calculated as difference between spot and retail price. (adapted from 
(Soile and Mu 2015)) 
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The calculation of subsidy payments and their distribution is done in three steps: First, the 
liter amount of kerosene and petrol consumed by each household annually is calculated, di-
viding total expenditure on the fuels by their respective fixed, subsidized domestic price per 
liter. Second, the amount of subsidy payment per liter of fuel can be calculated as the differ-
ence between their global spot market price and the fixed domestic price (c.f. Soile and Mu 
(2015)).
19
 To retrieve total subsidy payment per household, the subsidy payment per liter is 
multiplied by the liter quantity of fuel consumed by each household. To obtain the relative 
welfare impact, total payments per household are divided by their respective total income, 
approximated by total expenditure. Third, the distributional effect is estimated by averaging 
the total and relative (to income) household subsidy revenues over the ten income groups. 
5.4. Closing Infrastructure Access Gaps: Costs and Distribution 
The total cost of closing infrastructure access gaps in Nigeria until 2030 is estimated separate-
ly for water and sanitation, electricity and telecommunication, following Jakob et al. (forth-
coming). Necessary investments are assumed to be carried out over a horizon of 15 years, 
between 2015 and 2030 which is consistent with the timeframe of the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (Griggs et al. 2013). Estimates are expressed in per capita costs and include the 
provision as well as operation and maintenance (O&M). As infrastructure is expected to be 
constructed gradually until 2030, annual recurrent costs are taken into account only for half of 
the time span, i.e. 7.5 years. The calculations are based on different previous studies and esti-
mates:  
Access to drinking water and sanitation are understood in accordance with the World Bank's 
definition (World Bank 2016b): An "improved water source" includes piped water within the 
house or yard, public tabs or standpipes, tube wells, boreholes, protected springs and rain wa-
ter collection. "Improved sanitation" is defined as flush toilets to piped sewage or septic tanks, 
ventilated improved pit latrines or composting toilets. A World Health Organization (WHO) 
study by Hutton (2012, Annex C/D), analyzing investment needs with respect to the Millenni-
um Development Goals (MDGs), provides country-specific unit and recurrent costs for im-
proved water and sanitation provision, including the planning, construction, training, protec-
tion and O&M of installed units. Per capita costs for water and sanitation access provision 
until 2030, 𝑊/𝑆𝑝𝑐, are calculated respectively: 
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 As described in detail in footnote 3, the subsidies analyzed in this study are, thus, what is referred to as pre-tax 
subsidies, accounting only for their fiscal, but not for their external costs (D. Coady et al. 2015). 
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where access costs, 𝐴𝐶𝑤𝑠, are total costs to achieve universal water or sanitation access by 
2030, in US$ per capita in Nigeria. Recurrent costs in percent of total costs, 𝑅𝐶𝑤𝑠, given for 
the time span 2010 until 2015 in Nigeria (Hutton 2012, Annex C/D), are annualized and 
spread over half the time until 2030. While Hutton (2012) provides separate estimates for ru-
ral and urban areas, for reasons of consistency, this study uses an average of both. 
Cost projections for electricity access as well as for providing a minimum amount of electrici-
ty are based on the MESSAGE-Access energy system model (Pachauri et al. 2013).
20
 It is a 
dynamic linear optimization model based on data from nationally representative household 
surveys. Considering access by means of grid connection or decentralized sources, the model 
provides estimates for different regions, taking into account their respective heterogeneous 
economic conditions, energy supply potentials and population densities as well as preferred 
energy choices of poor populations living in rural or urban areas. Data for the Sub-Saharan 
African region are used. The model differentiates rural and urban provision. As only the rural 
costs are used in this study, neglecting cost-reducing factors like economies of scale, water 
and sanitation cost estimates are expected to be conservative. Per capita costs are: 
𝐸𝑝𝑐 =  𝐴𝑅𝐶𝑒 
( 8) 
where 𝐴𝑅𝐶𝑒 is the cost of new connection, including recurrent O&M costs, in US$ per capita, 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Telecommunication access provision costs use Jakob et al.’s (forthcoming) estimates for mo-
bile connection and usage costs. While access estimates include both landline and mobile 
connections, it is assumed that all new connections are mobile phones which is in line with 
observations from currently proliferating African countries (Aker and Mbiti 2010). Per capita 
mobile phone connection costs until 2030 are calculated as: 
𝑇𝑝𝑐 =  𝐴𝐶𝑡 +  𝑈𝐶𝑡 +  𝐴𝐶𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝐶𝑡  
( 9) 
In the absence of consistent data, a conservative fixed access cost, 𝐴𝐶𝑡, is chosen based on 
findings of a range of different studies reported by Rothman et al. (2014). Usage costs, 𝑈𝐶𝑡, 
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 With regard to the wide range of cost estimates from previous studies (Rothman et al. 2014), the MESSAGE-
Access model is hoped to produce more comprehensive estimates.   
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assume a fixed minute cost for an air time of 10 minutes per day per capita and recurring 
costs, 𝑅𝐶𝑡, expressed in percent of annual access costs, are again included for half of the time 
until 2030. 
The costs for providing access to each infrastructure type within the timeframe between 2015 
and 2030 are estimated in 2011 US$ per capita as shown in Tab. 3. They range from US$ 44 
per capita for the provision of improved water until 2030, telecommunication access provision 
is much more expensive at US$ 811. 
 improved water improved sanitation telecommunication electricity 
2030 Per Capita Cost US$ 44 US$ 235 US$ 811 US$ 371 
Tab. 3: Average per capita costs of infrastructure provision and operation and maintenance between 2015 
and 2030, by infrastructure type, in 2011 US$. 
In a final step, total costs and the distribution of closing infrastructure access gaps in Nigeria 
until 2030 are calculated for the four types of infrastructure, based on household survey data. 
Qualitative questions in the survey inform about the type of water source, the type of latrine, 
the source of electricity, if any, and phone use by household. For consistency reasons, the 
distribution effect is expressed in average per capita access gaps per income group. For total 
costs, the per capita share of population without access is determined for the survey year, us-
ing headcounts per household. These percentages are multiplied with the UN medium popula-
tion forecast (UN 2015b) for Nigeria in 2030 in order to retrieve the total per capita access 
gaps per infrastructure type. The respective 2030 estimates are multiplied with 𝑊𝑝𝑐, 𝑆𝑝𝑐, 
𝐸𝑝𝑐 and 𝑇𝑝𝑐 (Eq ( 7) to ( 9)) to estimate total costs in US$.  
5.5. Comparison of Carbon Revenues and Infrastructure Investment Needs 
with Sensitivity Analysis  
In order to assess to what extent revenues from carbon pricing reform would suffice to pro-
vide universal infrastructure access in Nigeria, total revenues from carbon pricing reform are 
compared to total investment needs for the timeframe between 2015 and 2030. The results are 
then compared under different assumptions in a sensitivity analysis. Importantly, only carbon 
tax revenues are fully included in the comparison because due to highly volatile and unfore-
seeable global crude oil prices, forecasting foregone subsidy payments for several years 
would be highly unreliable.  
For consistency reasons, the calculation of total carbon tax payments is also based on the UN 
medium population forecast (UN 2015b) for Nigeria. Assuming that per capita carbon foot-
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prints remain unchanged, total tax revenues are calculated for three different tax rates as fol-
lows: 
∑ 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖 ∗ 
2030
𝑖=2015
𝐶𝐹𝑝𝑐 ∗ 𝑡 
( 10) 
where 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖 is the total Nigerian population in year i, 𝐶𝐹𝑝𝑐 is the constant per capita carbon 
footprint, in tCO2, and t represents the three carbon tax levels, in US$ 2, 10 and 15 per t 
CO2.
21
 The resulting estimate of total carbon tax payments is conservative because average 
per capita carbon footprints are expected to grow with economic development until 2030 (c.f. 
Jakob, Haller, and Marschinski 2012). 
The results for each of the three tax levels are then compared to the cost estimates for each 
infrastructure type (calculated in 5.4), expressed as percentage shares of total revenue divided 
by total cost. Thus, the percentage shares indicate the extent to which universal access could 
be achieved for each infrastructure type using total carbon revenues from each tax rate. Final-
ly, a sensitivity analysis accounts for the uncertainties and potential inaccuracies of cost esti-
mates described in 5.4 and 5.6 regarding the relationship between the level of investment and 
the actual quality and quantity of infrastructure provided. As cost estimates can, thus, be ei-
ther largely over- or underestimated, besides the baseline investment need, cost scenarios of 
+/- 50 percent are included in the comparison.  
5.6.  Limitations 
The results of this analysis need to be evaluated in due consideration of a number of methodo-
logical limitations and assumptions: First, the price changes estimated in 5.1 based on envi-
ronmentally-extended MRIO are subject to a few inherent limitations: Most prominently, 
MRIO is a simple parsimonious price shifting model which assumes complete price inelastici-
ty. Potential price-induced fuel switches or efficiency measures in the production process are 
not taken into account. Instead the full pass through of higher production costs to domestic 
consumer prices is expected. Therefore, the calculated price changes, respective tax payments 
as well as revenues should be interpreted as short-term estimates or upper bounds of long-
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 Because no estimates of marginal abatement cost curves for Nigeria are available, the tax rates were chosen 
independent of optimality considerations, but in line with the lower globally available carbon tax rates (com-
pare (World Bank 2016b). The tax rates applied in this study are below estimates of globally optimal carbon 




 Furthermore, the estimates of tax-induced price changes implicitly assume 
that goods are non-traded. An upstream carbon tax, as it is suggested in this paper, can only 
be imposed on domestically purchased fuels and emissions throughout the domestic supply 
chain. Otherwise prices of imported goods would have to be raised by means of border tax 
adjustments according to their respective carbon content which would be politically and ad-
ministratively challenging.
23
 On the contrary, the non-traded assumption is not expected to 
largely distort results because most of the indirect price increases are due to higher costs of 
domestic transport for distributing goods and services, a price component which is inherently 
domestic (Arze del Granado, Coady, and Gillingham 2012, 2237).  
Second, carbon footprints, tax payments and relative welfare impacts estimated in 5.2 by 
combining MRIO and household expenditure data are subject to a number of limitations: 
Again, the method implicitly assumes complete inelasticity, i.e. households do not reduce the 
impact of a tax by changing their consumption baskets and substituting away from carbon 
intensive goods Arze del Granado, Coady, and Gillingham (2012). Another assumption in the 
calculation of the distributional effects is that the purchasing power of consumers stays the 
same across income groups and regions, i.e. that the amount of goods acquirable for one mon-
etary unit is independent of the standard of living. Really, however, it can be expected that 
very wealthy households purchase more expensive goods, so that on aggregate their carbon 
footprint might be overestimated (c.f. Kerkhof, Nonhebel, and Moll 2009). Furthermore, both 
the MRIO data as well as household consumption data are distorted by the pre-existing subsi-
dies on kerosene and petrol. In absence of the subsidy, less or other types of fuel as well as 
less carbon intensive goods might be consumed by industry and households, so that observed 
data might overestimate the 'true' carbon intensity of consumption. Analyzing fuel consump-
tion patterns in urban areas in Nigeria, Nwachukwu and Chike (2011) find high price elastici-
ties of demand, indicating excessive fuel consumption due to the subsidy regime. Another 
shortcoming is that the model used in this study cannot measure the welfare effect of carbon 
prices through income. Impacts of abatement activities on wages, returns to capital and labor 
supply can be substantial, as found by Beck et al. (2015) in British Colombia and Fullerton 
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 The advantage of a static MRIO compared to a Computer-based General Equilibrium (CGE) model is that it is 
much less data and modeling intensive. Because CGE models require the specification of utility and profit 
functions, implicit demand functions and commodity and factor market structures, they would necessitate 
strong assumptions due to a lack of reliable information and data on the Nigerian economy (c.f. Beegle et al. 
2016; Arze del Granado, Coady, and Gillingham 2012, 2236–7). 
23
 Concerning the feasibility and effectiveness of border tax adjustments refer e.g. to Jakob, Marschinski, and 
Hübler (2013) and Böhringer, Rutherford, and Balistreri (2012). 
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(2009) in the UK. Moreover, the carbon intensities calculated with the environmentally-
extended MRIO are sector averages which might result in imprecise estimates of carbon con-
tent of disaggregated consumption items. Finally, the validity of results crucially depends on 
the quality of underlying data which might, for example, be diminished by partially large 
amounts of missing data points in the household consumption survey. 
Third, estimates of subsidy payments in 5.3 based on average annual spot prices might result 
in slight inaccuracies due to the high volatility of fossil fuel prices. Using the official subsi-
dized retail price might also be misleading as it disregards potential illegal re-selling, fuel 
smuggling and other fraud which might result in higher end-consumer prices (c.f. IISD 2012). 
Unpredictability of volatile global crude oil prices also makes it impossible to reliably fore-
cast total future subsidy payments over a longer time horizon. Finally, the subsidy payments 
accruing to the government which are extrapolated from the described calculations only ac-
count for direct fuel consumption in the household sector, and therefore only account for a 
fraction of total subsidies. 
Fourth, the estimates of infrastructure provision costs and distribution described in 5.4 are 
subject to a number of assumptions and uncertainties which might limit their accuracy: First, 
the assumption that, without explicit intervention, the share of population lacking access to 
certain types of infrastructure in the year 2030 will remain the same as in the survey year dis-
regards both urbanization
24
 as well as intrinsic synergies between infrastructure and economic 
growth. Instead it can be expected that with economic growth gaps start to shrink - at least in 
terms of percent of population - as part of the economy’s development process. However, 
reliable growth forecasts especially for Nigeria do not exist for the relevant 2030 horizon and, 
moreover, the level of economic performance does not suffice to explain the level of infra-
structure development (Jakob et al. (forthcoming); Onyeji, Bazilian, and Nussbaumer 2012; 
Winkler et al. 2011). Second, infrastructure investments are likely to be undertaken to some 
extent by the private sector and, thus, do not have to be entirely financed by the government. 
Universal access would then require fewer public funds than expected in this study. This 
should be especially expected in the revenue generating telecommunication industry where 
private sector involvement is therefore common (Jakob et al. (forthcoming)). For these two 
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 Between 2010 and 2015 the average annual rate of urbanization in Nigeria was rather significant with 4.7 
percent (CIA 2016). However, this information does not allow for predicting how percentage shares of infra-
structure access within the population might shift as urbanization could entail positive as well as negative ef-
fects. 
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reasons, the overall infrastructure cost estimates used in this study should be regarded as con-
servative numbers. However, high rates of corruption, misappropriation as well as low effi-
ciency of public expenditure and service delivery in Nigeria might reduce quality and quantity 
of infrastructure actually provided relative to investments (Barungi, Ogunleye, and Zamba 
2015; Siddig et al. 2014). Additional inaccuracies arise from using regional and global esti-
mates for estimating the cost of telecommunication and electricity provision as well as from 
converting from household level data to per capita access; both can result in under- or overes-
timation of access gaps and costs. Finally, cost estimates are sensitive to uncertain future 
technology innovations and costs. These considerations are taken into embraced in the sensi-
tivity analysis in 5.5. 
6. Results  
The analyses carried out in this paper predominantly point toward regressivity of subsidies 
and progressivity of both an economy-wide carbon tax as well as infrastructure investments in 
Nigeria. First, carbon intensity of consumption and the distribution of the total and relative 
income impact of respective tax payments are presented (6.1). For better representation and 
more detailed insights, consumption is broken down in five direct and indirect product catego-
ries. Second, direct energy consumption patterns as well as the distribution of income gains 
from the kerosene and petrol subsidies are described (6.2), followed, third, by the distribution 
of infrastructure access by income quintiles (6.3). In a final step (6.4), the estimates of total 
infrastructure investment needs and tax revenues until 2030 are compared and briefly dis-
cussed in terms of their overall distributional effect on per capita basis. 
6.1. Carbon Tax: Total Payments and Distribution of Income Impacts 
In order to investigate the carbon intensity of household consumption and respective tax pay-
ments in further detail, direct and indirect energy consumption are further broken down into 
expenditures on fossil fuels and electricity (direct) as well as on public transport, other goods 
and services and on food (indirect).
25
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 For a full convergence table for the matching of GTAP sectors with the five categories refer to Appendix B. 
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Fig. 2: Average carbon intensities by product category in Nigeria in 2011, in tons of CO2 per PPP-adjusted 
2011 US$ 
Fig. 2 shows the average carbon intensities of all products subsumed in each category, i.e. the 
tons of CO2 embodied in one US$ of their consumption. The monetary values represent 2011 
US$ which are adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP), using the conversion factor for 
Nigeria (World Bank 2016b). Fossil fuel and electricity use, i.e. direct energy consumption 
for cooking, heating, lighting and private transport, are by far the most carbon intensive cate-
gories. This finding reassures the presumption that, as a consequence of carbon pricing, price 
changes of energy commodities will be largest. Among indirect consumption categories in 
Nigeria, public transport is most carbon-intensive, but still is less than a third as carbon-
intensive as fossil fuels. Other goods and services which comprise, for example, clothing and 
water use are comparatively little carbon intensive and emissions from consumption of food 
products are even lower relative to each monetary unit.
26
 Importantly, in the case of an econ-
omy-wide carbon tax, these carbon intensities can be directly interpreted as relative tax-
induced price change of each product category. 
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 The carbon intensity data account only for energy-related CO2 emissions (because those are subject to the 
upstream carbon tax). If non-energy-related sources of GHG emissions, such as methane or nitrous oxide 



































Fig. 3: Average expenditure shares by product category and income quintile in Nigeria in 2011, in percent 
of total average expenditure. 
As expected, with rising income, smaller shares are spent on food, while the consumption of 
all other product categories relatively - and in total - increases with income (Fig. 3).
27
 The use 
of public transport as well as electricity is overall higher in urban areas which indicates higher 
infrastructure coverage in more densely populated urban areas, but might to some extent also 
be due to higher average income levels. Notably, the expenditure shares of direct energy con-
sumption are relatively small, between 1 percent (R1) and 4 percent (U5), which is likely to 
be attributable to the large amounts of non-purchased traditional biomass used for cooking 
and heating as discussed below (c.f. Fig. 5 and Excursus). Increasing shares of all (carbon-
intensive) product categories except for food already indicate that an economy-wide carbon 
tax might be progressively distributed across income groups. This assumption is reassured by 
Fig. 4 which shows both the total per capita carbon footprint (bar chart) as well as the relative 
welfare impact of a US$ 10 tax per ton of CO2 (lines) across income groups.  
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Fig. 4: Average per capita carbon footprints, in tons of CO2 (bar chart), and income impact of US$ 10 tax 
per tCO2 (PPP-adjusted), as percentage share of tax payments of annual per capita expenditure (line 
chart). 
Clearly, the share of carbon tax payments in total annual expenditure which is used as proxy 
for tax-induced income loss rises as income increases, making carbon taxation progressive 
(line chart). For households in the bottom rural quintile R1, the income impact would be only 
0.4 percent while it would reach almost 0.9 percent for the richest urban quintile. Generally, 
the percentage shares increase rather steadily across all income quintiles from R1 to U1. This 
indicates that the relative carbon intensity of consumption not only increases with income, but 
also that urban households tend to consume relatively more carbon-intensive goods. For ex-
ample, the average per capita footprint of households in R2 is only 2/3 of that of households 
in U1 even though both household groups have comparable income levels. Partially, again 
this can be attributed to higher shares of electricity and public transport in urban consumption 
baskets due to wider infrastructure coverage. Especially, the share of direct emissions from 
fuel combustion and electricity use increases. A comparison of the share of direct versus indi-
rect emissions in the total footprint shows that the share of indirect emissions rather steadily 
decreases with rising income as well as from rural to urban, which is exactly in line with find-
ings by Siddig et al. (2014). R1 exhibits a share of 70 percent of indirect emissions, U1 a 
share of 54 percent and U5 a share of 43 percent of indirect emissions in the total footprint.
28
 
Total per capita carbon footprints range from 0.1 tCO2 in R1 up to 1.8 tCO2, averaging at 0.45 
tCO2 throughout the Nigerian population which is still low in global comparison. This finding 
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 This finding is roughly in line with Arze del Granado, Coady, and Gillingham (2012) who find that in African 

























































In conclusion, this analysis shows that a carbon tax would have clearly progressive income 
impacts in Nigeria with richer households bearing a relatively higher tax burden. This effect is 
found to be due to the described differences in consumption baskets of households of different 
income levels as well as of different geographic locations, confirming the assumption of gen-
eral socio-economic differences between rural and urban residents. Furthermore, the loss of 
real income due to a US$ 10 tax would be relatively modest across all income groups. 
6.2.  Kerosene and Petrol Subsidies: Total Payments and Distribution of In-
come Impacts 
Before a positive carbon price like a tax can be introduced, existing distortions and negative 
price signals, namely the kerosene and petrol subsidies in Nigeria, have to be abolished which 
entails a separate direct loss of income to households. In 2011, the liter price of kerosene was 
fixed at NGN 50 (US$ 0.34), the liter price of petrol was fixed at NGN 65 (US$ 0.44).  
Before analyzing the distribution of total payments as well as relative welfare gains from the 
kerosene and petrol subsidy, in order to get a more comprehensive picture of energy con-
sumption patterns, a brief look is taken at the share of different energy carriers in total direct 
energy consumption of household groups in Fig. 5. Direct energy expenditures are split up 
into kerosene, petrol, coal as well as gas and other liquid fuels, which are subsumed in the 
category 'fossil fuels' above, into electricity and into firewood which is excluded from the 
carbon tax analysis.
30
 Clearly, the relative importance of petrol in households' energy mix 
steadily increases with income. This is also the case for kerosene with the exception of the 
two richest urban quintiles. While households in U4 and U5 still supply a larger part of their 
energy needs with liquid fuels, petrol is relatively more important for their energy use. As 
expected, the share of firewood declines with income as well as between rural and urban areas 
as total energy consumption increases. While Fig. 5 provides an overview of energy use pat-
terns, the analysis of the distribution of subsidy payments necessitates information on the 
fuels' total expenditure shares. 
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 The difference between estimates can largely be attributed to the fact that the World Bank includes emissions 
from solid biomass such as firewood, while emissions from burning biomass are excluded from this study as 
they would not be subject to carbon taxation. 
30
 The NBS survey results suggest that typically only between 3 and 10 percent of the firewood used is pur-
chased so that market-based regulation of its use, e.g. through a tax, is virtually impossible. 
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Fig. 5: Average shares of total expenditure on direct energy consumption by energy source and income 
quintile in Nigeria in 2011, in percent of total average energy expenditure. Note: The expenditures on 
firewood represent a self-estimated equivalent market value of the firewood used, including purchased and 
non-purchased wood. Including only actual expenditures would largely distort the results as the share of 
purchased firewood is very small.
31
 
Fig.  summarizes the results for the petrol subsidy. The bar chart depicts annual per capita 
subsidy revenues in 2011 US$, averaged across income groups. The line chart shows the av-
erage welfare gain from subsidy payments for households of different income groups, meas-
ured as percentage share of total annual expenditure.  
 
Fig. 7: Petrol subsidy: Average per capita payments, in 2011 US$ (bar chart), and income impact, as per-
centage share of total expenditure (line chart), by income groups in Nigeria in 2011.  
The distribution of income gains from the petrol subsidy is strongly regressive, that is with 
higher income levels the welfare gain increases relative to total income. While at the lowest 
income level (R1) the income gain is only 0.3 percent, it climbs as high as 1.76 percent in the 
highest quintile (U5). Again, the line chart indicates that among urban households the con-
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 The self-reported market value of freely obtained firewood has to be treated as rough estimate. Bacon, 
Bhattacharya, and Kojima (2010) note that due to large geographic and temporal price variation the relation-


























































































sumption share of petrol is overall slightly higher than in rural areas. The steep jumps toward 
the last rural R5 and the second to last urban U4 could be due to increased private transport. A 
mean income of between US$ 2,300 (U4) and US$ 2,600 (R4) could then be interpreted as 
threshold to own a private vehicle. Total per capita subsidy payments are distributed accord-
ingly with the largest amounts being paid to those with presumably the highest standard of 
living. On average, a person in the lowest quintile (R1) receives annually US$ 0.8, rising to 
US$ 13.4 in the highest rural quintile R5 and climaxing at US$ 35.3 per person in the richest 




Fig. 8: Kerosene subsidy: Average per capita payments, in PPP-adjusted 2011 US$ (bar chart), and wel-
fare impact, as percentage share of total expenditure (line chart), by income groups in Nigeria in 
2011; Note: For reasons of better comparability, total per capita subsidy payments (bar chart) are not ad-
justed for purchasing power parity. 
Results concerning the distribution of the kerosene subsidy are slightly less clear (c.f. 8). With 
the exception of the bottom quintile (R1), in rural areas subsidy payments are distributed re-
gressively, with relative income gains rising with income, while among urban quintiles the 
distribution is neutral or slightly progressive.
33
 At around 1.65 percent of total income, poorer 
urban households in U1 to U3 have the highest relative income gain, indicating that relative to 
income their kerosene expenditures are highest. This quasi regressive distribution is largely 
due to the fact that the highest two urban quintiles supply the major portion of their steeply 
rising energy demand with petrol, so that overall kerosene takes a smaller share while total 
per capita kerosene consumption is still higher than in poorer households (see Fig. 5). Again, 
the largest annual per capita payments of up to US$ 23 (U5) are captured by wealthier parts of 
society.  
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 Annual estimates of relative and total subsidy payments are highly dependent on variations of the global crude 
oil price. The estimates in this study are to be interpreted as averages for the year 2011 only. 
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 Kerosene Petrol 
R1 4.34% 1.78% 
R2 5.23% 4.62% 
R3 7.01% 6.96% 
R4 9.35% 8.02% 
R5 14.55% 16.73% 
U1 7.27% 3.05% 
U2 10.17% 6.94% 
U3 13.30% 9.49% 
U4 14.54% 17.34% 
U5 14.24% 25.07% 
Tab. 4: Percentage share of total kerosene and petrol subsidy payments, by income groups in Nigeria in 
2011; Note: The percentages are shares of total subsidy payments received directly by households, not in-
cluding subsidy gains from marketers or industry. 
Finally, irrespective of the relative distribution of subsidy payments, there is substantial leak-
age of payments to higher income groups. Tab. 4 lists each income group's percentage shares 
of total subsidy payments received directly by the household sector in Nigeria in 2011. Shares 
steadily increase with rising income. Importantly, the share of total population declines with 
higher income groups (c.f. Tab. 1). Thus, for example, households in the highest urban quin-
tile U5 represent 4.9 percent of the population, but capture 14.2 percent of total kerosene sub-
sidy payments to households and more than a quarter of petrol subsidy payments. Similarly, 
the richest rural group R5 represents 8.6 percent of the population, but captures 14.6 and 16.7 
percent of the kerosene and petrol subsidy received by households. Due to the larger total per 
capita payments, high income groups capture a disproportionally higher share of total pay-
ments. This is also true for the kerosene subsidy even though it partially exhibits progressive 
distribution. 
In conclusion, neither the petrol nor the kerosene subsidy serve as instrument for pro-poor 
income redistribution. This analysis shows that income gains from the petrol subsidy are 
strongly regressive in Nigeria with richer households receiving higher dividends relative to 
total income. This is due to the fact that with rising income petrol gains in relative importance 
in the energy mix. The distribution of kerosene tax payments is neutral or slightly progressive. 
However, in terms of total payments, leakage to a small and very rich upper class is found to 
be substantial. Furthermore, gains in real income among the poorest income groups are found 









6.3.  Closing Infrastructure Access Gaps: Costs and Distribution 
The analysis of the distribution of infrastructure access gaps across household groups in Nige-
ria indicates that, as expected, access improves with rising income (c.f. Fig. ). Overall, the 
diagram reveals that access shares rise throughout all quintiles R1 to U5, indicating not only 
that access improves with higher income, but also that at comparable income levels a larger 
share of urban residents has access. Especially electricity access rises steeply throughout all 
quintiles R1 to U5. While in the case of improved drinking water the per capita access share 
per income group does not fall below 50 percent even in the bottom rural quintile R1, only 13 
percent in R1 have access to electricity. Notably, from R3 onward telecommunication access 
is highest among all types of infrastructure. This might indicate that telecommunication ac-
cess is slightly overestimated due to the conversion from household access to per capita ac-
cess. While for all other infrastructure types, this method is straightforward, in the case of 
personal mobile phones household access does not necessarily entail personal access. Overall, 
public investment to increase infrastructure provision can be expected to have a progressive 
distributional impact, entailing relatively larger gains and improvements in human well-being 
among poorer segments of the Nigerian society. This finding confirms the assumption that 
revenue recycling into infrastructure development could not only further overall economic 
performance, but could also serve as instrument for long-term pro-poor income redistribution. 
Fig. 9: Infrastructure access, as per capita percentage share of 
persons with access, by income group in Nigeria in 2011 (left); percentage share of total population 
without infrastructure access in Nigeria in 2011 (right) 
With regards to the total Nigerian population, access gaps translate to 41.9 percent lacking 
access to improved sanitation, 45.8 percent without electricity, 29.9 percent without a mobile 
phone or landline and 35.7 percent with no access to an improved source of drinking water 
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mate (65 percent with access), the estimate for sanitation access is more optimistic than that 
of the World Bank (30 percent with access) (World Bank 2016b).
34
 Both telecommunication 
as well as electricity access estimates are also slightly more optimistic than the results of 
Jakob et al. (forthcoming) who find 40 percent and 52 percent respectively (for 2010).  
6.4.  Comparison of Carbon Revenues and Infrastructure Investment Needs 
with Sensitivity Analysis 
Finally, total investment needs, tax revenues as well as subsidy savings are compared. For this 
purpose, total revenues between 2015 and 2030 are calculated for three different tax levels, 
namely US$ 2, 10 and 15 per tCO2. Furthermore, extrapolated to the total Nigerian population 
in 2030, which will grow to 273 million (UN 2015b), the percentage shares of population 
without access together with per capita cost estimates yield total investment needs listed in 
Tab. 5 to provide universal access in Nigeria between 2015 and 2030. In total they sum up to 
US$ 144 billion. To analyze the sensitivity of results (as described in Section 5.5), besides the 
baseline investment need, cost scenarios of +/- 50 percent are considered. The percentage 
shares, expressed as total revenue divided by total cost in Tab. 5, indicate the extent to which 
universal access could be achieved using total carbon revenues, split up by infrastructure type, 
cost scenario and tax rate.
35
 
  improved water improved sanitation telecommunication electricity total  
investment needs 
tax level & revenue  
US$ 4.25 bn 26.85 bn 66.19 bn 46.32 bn 143.61 bn 
US$ 2/tCO2 
US$ 3.69 bn 
- 50% 173.6% 27.5% 11.2% 15.9% 5.1% 
baseline 86.8% 13.8% 5.6% 8.0% 2.6% 
+ 50% 57.9% 9.2% 3.7% 5.3% 1.7% 
US$ 10/tCO2 
US$ 18.46 bn 
- 50% 868.2% 137.5% 55.8% 79.7% 25.7% 
baseline 434.1% 68.8% 27.9% 39.9% 12.9% 
+ 50% 289.4% 45.9% 18.6% 26.6% 8.6% 
US$ 15/tCO2 
US$ 27.69 bn 
- 50% 1302.3% 206.3% 83.7% 119.6% 38.6% 
baseline 651.2% 103.2% 41.8% 59.8% 19.3% 
+ 50% 434.1% 68.8% 27.9% 39.9% 12.9% 
Tab. 5: Total baseline investment needs for universal infrastructure access in Nigeria between 2015 and 
2030, in 2011 US$ (non-adjusted); Comparison of total carbon tax revenues between 2015 and 2030, 
for tax levels of 2011 US$ 2, 10 and 15 per tCO2, and total investment needs, by infrastructure type; 
sensitivity analysis assuming +/- 50% of estimated infrastructure costs. Note: Each column assumes 
that all revenues are invested solely in the respective type; 'total' assumes that investments are spread 
evenly between all types. 
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 The reason for this divergence needs to be subject to further research. It is definitely not an issue of definition 
of "improved sanitation" as the LSMS questionnaire uses clearly attributable terms. 
35
 Importantly, each column assumes that all revenues are invested solely in the respective type; 'total' assumes 
that investments are spread evenly between all types. 
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Even in the most optimistic scenario with the highest tax level and lowest investment needs, 
revenues suffice to close less than 40 percent of total infrastructure gaps until 2030. Taken 
separately however, water investment needs can likely be almost covered even in the US$ 2 
tax scenario, for sanitation the US$ 10 tax is likely to suffice and revenues from a US$ 15 
carbon tax might be enough to provide universal electricity access. Telecommunication in-
vestment needs would demand for an even higher tax level. In order to provide universal ac-
cess to infrastructure at baseline investment needs until 2030 a tax level of between US$ 75 
and US$ 80 per tCO2 would be necessary in Nigeria. 
Importantly, Tab. 6 indicates that even at a US$ 15 tax rate, tax payments would still result in 
moderate annual per capita income losses between 0.6 percent (R1) to 1.3 percent (U5). For 
each tax level and income group, Tab. 6 contrasts the average per capita income loss due to 
tax payments with the chance to gain infrastructure access if public investments are spread 
equitably on a per capita basis.
36
 It indicates, for example, that under a US$ 15 tax scenario, 
an average person in R1 would pay 0.6 percent of her income as tax, but would stand a 12.7 
percent chance of gaining access to infrastructure, while an average person in U5 would lose 
1.3 percent of her income and stand a chance of only 2.6 percent to gain infrastructure access. 
As expected, percentage changes of both income and access reveal progressive distributions. 
The columns for a US$ 2 tax indicate that while overall income as well as infrastructure ac-
cess would change less than 0.2 percent and less than 2 percent respectively (column 'access'), 
if revenues were invested solely in the provision of improved drinking water substantial im-
provements could be achieved, ranging from 42 percent chance of access gains (R1) to 17 
percent (U5). The progressivity of electricity access gains under a US$ 15 tax scenario would 
be even more pronounced. While losing only 0.6 percent of her income, a person in the poor-
est rural income group R1 who does not yet have access to electricity would on average have 
a 52 percent chance of gaining access until 2030.  
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 Importantly, each column assumes that all revenues are invested solely in the respective type, W (improved 
water), S (improved sanitation), T (telecommunication) or E (electricity); 'access' assumes that all infrastruc-
ture types are supplied evenly. 
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W S T E 
access 
gain (%) 
R1 - 0.08 + 42 + 9 + 4 + 7 + 1.7 - 0.38 +100 + 44 + 18 + 35 + 8.5 - 0.57 + 100 + 66 + 27 + 52 + 12.7 
R2 - 0.08 + 42 + 8 + 3 + 6 + 1.5 - 0.38 +100 + 40 + 15 + 30  + 7.6 - 0.57 + 100 + 60 + 23 + 45 + 11.4 
R3 - 0.09 + 41 + 8 + 2 + 5 + 1.4 - 0.45 +100 + 41 + 12 + 27 + 7.0 - 0.67 + 100 + 61 + 17 + 41 + 10.4 
R4 - 0.10 + 39 + 7 + 2 + 5 + 1.2 - 0.52 +100 + 37 + 10 + 23 + 6.2 - 0.77 + 100 + 55 + 15 + 35 + 9.3 
R5 - 0.14 + 33 + 6 + 1 + 3 + 0.9 - 0.68 +100 + 28 + 6 + 16 + 4.6 - 1.02 + 100 + 43 + 10 + 24 + 6.8 
U1 - 0.13 + 21 + 6 + 1 + 2 + 0.8 - 0.64 +100 + 29 + 7 + 11 + 3.8 - 0.97 + 100 + 43 + 10 + 17 + 5.7 
U2 - 0.14 + 20 + 5 + 1 + 1 + 0.6 - 0.71 + 98 + 26 + 4 + 7 + 3.0 - 1.07 + 100 + 39 + 7 + 10 + 4.5 
U3 - 0.15 + 18 + 4 + 1  +1 + 0.5 - 0.76 + 91 + 18 + 4 + 6 + 2.4 - 1.13 + 100 + 27 + 6 + 9 + 3.6 
U4 - 0.17 + 17  +4 + 1 + 1 + 0.4 - 0.83 + 86 + 18 + 3 + 5 + 2.2 - 1.24 + 100 + 27 + 5 + 7 + 3.3 
U5 - 0.18 + 17 + 3 + 0 + 1 + 0.3  -0.88 + 83 + 13 + 2 + 3 + 1.7 - 1.32 + 100 + 20 + 3 + 5 + 2.6 
Tab. 6: Average per capita income loss and infrastructure access gains at different tax levels until 2030, 
assuming an equitable spread on per capita basis, by income group as percentage shares (adjusted 
for PPP). Note: Positive percentages of access gain refer only to those individuals who did not previously 
have access. Individuals who already have access have no gain; each column assumes that all revenues are 
invested solely in the respective type, W (improved water), S (improved sanitation), T (telecommunica-
tion) or E (electricity); 'access' assumes that all infrastructure types are supplied evenly; infrastructure cost 
estimates are from the baseline scenario.  
Carbon revenues as well as infrastructure provision would be more pronounced if savings 
from the subsidy reform were taken into account in this analysis. Due to the highly volatile 
and unforeseeable global price of crude oil, forecasting foregone subsidy payments for several 
years would be highly unreliable. Furthermore, for the explained reasons, the subsidy pay-
ments captured and reported by households do not provide information on the actual fiscal 
costs of the regime. While this analysis calculates a total of US$ 2.4 billion captured by 
households through direct fuel consumption, the 2011 budget report of the Nigerian Ministry 
of Finance lists total domestic fuel subsidy payments with US$ 5.28 billion (or NGN 785.91 
billion) in 2011 (FMF 2012). Notably according to this analysis, this 2011 amount would 
have sufficed to provide universal access to improved water by 2030. Between 2011 and 2014 
the Nigerian government spent a total of 2011 US$ 23.3 billion on fuel subsidies. This 
amount would have, for example, sufficed to provide almost universal access to improved 
sanitation by 2030 (c.f. Tab. 5) (IEA 2015a). However, due to the 2016 subsidy reform and 
the steep decline in global crude oil prices, future subsidy costs and potential savings are ex-
pected to be much lower or even null. Therefore, this analysis includes savings from subsidies 
only in the distributional, but not in the overall quantitative analysis.  
Concluding from the comparison of total revenues and costs, universal access to all four infra-
structure types is not likely to be provided by a carbon tax in Nigeria. Therefore, certain infra-
49 
structure types should be prioritized before others. Alternatively, an even higher carbon tax of 
up to US$ 75 and US$ 80 per tCO2 could be imposed to cover full investment needs. Howev-
er, a respective tax reform seems currently politically infeasible due to the recent subsidy re-
form. Provision of each of the four infrastructure types would have a strongly progressive 
impact and, especially among lower income groups, tax-induced loss of real income is rela-
tively smaller than potential infrastructure access gains. Overall, revenues even from lower 
tax levels can provide a first source of finance for closing infrastructure access gaps before 
further financial resources are available.  
7. Discussion and Conclusion 
While widespread carbon pricing is a necessary prerequisite for cost-effective and successful 
climate change mitigation, particularly in developing countries, the introduction of respective 
policy instruments is heavily contested due to the expected adverse effects on income distri-
bution. Analyzing the case of Nigeria, this study investigates if revenue recycling into basic 
infrastructure development can serve to adequately compensate poor segments of society, 
reduce social inequality and, thereby, make unilateral carbon pricing a more attractive policy 
option. 
In Nigeria, carbon pricing and infrastructure development are separately found to be progres-
sive, that is, to benefit the poor relatively more - or respectively cost them less - than richer 
income groups. Both in terms of total payments and relative to income, positive carbon prices 
either by means of a fossil fuel subsidy reform or a carbon tax exhibit strongly progressive 
impacts on income distribution. This is because, relative to income, richer households were 
found to consume larger quantities of direct fuels, including kerosene and petrol, as well as of 
carbon-intensive goods and services. This evidence from Nigeria is in line with the majority 
of studies on developing countries reviewed in Section 2.3. Regarding total impacts, reduc-
tions in real income due to carbon taxation as well as subsidy removal were found to be rela-
tively modest, especially among poorer income groups. Further research, adding to Siddig et 
al. (2014), could re-evaluate the magnitude of the distributional impact by analyzing second-
order effects in Nigeria: First, an analysis of price elasticities of demand could shed light on 
adaptive behavior of consumers as well as producers in Nigeria. A potential finding could be 
that with time overall carbon intensities decrease and the tax burden shrinks. Because richer 
households are commonly thought of as more price elastic, the progressivity of a carbon tax 
could become less pronounced over time. This would indicate that carbon pricing successfully 
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incentivizes mitigation, predominantly tackling the emissions of upper classes. Second, im-
pacts through changes in income levels could be added to the analysis, investigating how tax-
induced changes in factor prices influence households' incomes over time. Moreover, the va-
lidity of the assumption of constant purchasing power parity across income groups could be 
re-evaluated as it might lead to an overestimation of the consumption-based emissions of 
richer households and also result in overly progressive effects. Because such analyses them-
selves require strong assumptions due to the lack of reliable information on some parameters 
of the Nigerian economy, this study is based on a static analysis and estimates are to be inter-
preted as short-term impacts.
37
 In line with previous studies on developing countries, carbon 
taxation is found to have positive redistributive effects, while fossil fuel subsidies fail as, least 
of all efficient, policy instrument for protecting poor households in Nigeria. 
Investing carbon revenues to close infrastructure access gaps could indeed compensate poorer 
segments of society for reductions in real income due to carbon pricing, according to this 
analysis. All four types of basic infrastructure, namely improved water, improved sanitation, 
electricity and telecommunication, were found to be relatively less accessible for poor income 
groups in Nigeria so that, if access was increased equitably, they would benefit most: For ex-
ample, under a US$ 15 tax scenario a person in a poorer rural household would on average 
pay around 0.6 percent of their income as tax, but would stand a chance of up to 13 percent to 
gain infrastructure assess, while an average person from a richer urban household would sac-
rifice 1.3 percent of their income, but stand a chance of only 3 percent to acquire infrastruc-
ture access. This insight adds to the general literature on infrastructure and inequality as indi-
cated by Calderón and Servén (2014). However, concluding from the comparison of total rev-
enues and costs, universal access to all four infrastructure types is not likely to be provided by 
a carbon tax in Nigeria. Universal access until 2030 would necessitate a carbon tax rate of 
between US$ 75 and US$ 80 per tCO2. This seems currently politically infeasible as energy 
prices were just recently raised during the subsidy reform. Thus, the extent of pro-poor com-
pensation depends on if investments are to be spread equitably or even focused on poorer ru-
ral areas. Further research could aim to improve estimates of infrastructure provision costs, 
investigating in further detail the reciprocal link between infrastructure and economic growth 
as well as the potential of private sector involvement in infrastructure investment in Nigeria. 
A possible outcome could be that over longer time horizons public costs might decrease more 
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 For a discussion of data availability and respective limitations for research in African countries refer to Beegle 
et al. (2016).  
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than assumed in this cost comparison. In any case, revenues even from lower tax levels could 
provide a first source of finance for closing infrastructure access gaps before alternative fi-
nancial resources, for example from international funds, are available.  
Importantly, the largest disparities in terms of infrastructure access and income occur spatially 
between rural and urban areas in Nigeria. Thus, universal or at least equitable infrastructure 
development could not only reduce inequalities between income groups, but could also miti-
gate existing structural differences between regions and facilitate inclusive growth. On the 
downside, 'redistribution' by means of infrastructure development can be problematic because 
access gains do not directly translate into monetary gains and, therefore, might not suffice to 
mitigate the tax-induced income loss of households. Furthermore, such indirect benefits from 
infrastructure access are likely to occur with considerable time lag between tax collection and 
actual construction and utilization. A possible approach to these drawbacks, which would also 
be in line with strategic plans by the Nigerian government, could be to focus first on universal 
electricity access because its current distribution is most regressive and households’ monetary 
savings from foregone use of other energy sources might be most tangible.  
In order to yield socially coherent and environmentally effective outcomes, the analyzed poli-
cy measures necessarily need to be embedded in a larger sustainability framework, deliberate-
ly redistributing in favor of the poor and promoting environmentally-friendly practices. Espe-
cially, in the power sector the tax-induced price signal might not be strong enough to incentiv-
ize efficient and clean energy supply and avoid carbon-intensive lock-ins. Furthermore, reduc-
ing the excessive consumption of unsustainable firewood in the household sector in Nigeria is 
indispensable for sustainable development, but cannot be achieved by means of carbon taxa-
tion. Instead it necessitates the provision of accessible and affordable alternative energy 
sources. In recent years, the Nigerian government has put forward concrete policy measures, 
such as feed-in tariffs and quota, as well as long-term goals for expansion of renewable ener-
gy sources and electrification rates. Building for instance on Oyedepo's (2014) and Aliyu et 
al.'s (2013) analyses of the Nigerian energy system, a detailed policy analysis could assess 
how the current regulatory framework would have to be adapted in order for carbon pricing 
and infrastructure expansion to be conductive for socially and environmentally sustainable 
development while also meeting Nigeria's growing energy demand.  
Finally, the implementation of the analyzed policy mix in Nigeria could be hampered accord-
ing to the common concern that carbon pricing is politically infeasible in developing coun-
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tries. However, the Nigerian government has explicitly considered fiscal reform as instrument 
for climate change mitigation and acknowledged the positive economic effects of investing 
respective revenues in infrastructure development. It has also taken according actions, empha-
sizing their co-benefits: The stated reasons for partially abolishing the fossil fuel subsidy 
scheme were mainly its failure to redistribute pro-poor and its high fiscal costs which were 
crowding out other public investments, particularly in infrastructure. The expansion of infra-
structure is motivated by the expected positive impact on business climate and private sector 
development in Nigeria. Against this background, a thorough analysis of the Nigerian politi-
cal economy, including political motivations, competing interests and power constellations 
which influence energy and environmental policy-making, could evaluate the prospect of car-
bon taxation in Nigeria. Also, it could assess which factors, including the considerably lower 
oil prices, led to higher public acceptance during the latest subsidy reform in 2016, in contrast 
to the 2012 attempt. Irrespective of their political feasibility, however, the success of respec-
tive measures might be hampered by inadequate implementation due to Nigeria's poor institu-
tional and governance capacities. High corruption and misappropriation rates as well as low 
efficiency of public expenditures might reduce the quality and quantity of infrastructure pro-
vision at certain investment levels (IMF 2013b). While such losses due to inefficiencies and 
corruption would be expected to decrease with the removal of the subsidy regime, they might 
increase in relation to the introduction of carbon taxation and infrastructure construction. Po-
litical fraud also negatively affects political credibility and public acceptance of reforms. 
In conclusion, the systematic analysis of micro-level household data conducted in this paper 
finds strong evidence of the positive impact of carbon pricing as well as of infrastructure de-
velopment on the reduction of social inequality in Nigeria. Loss of real income due to carbon 
pricing is particularly modest for lower-income households. This finding debilitates the con-
cern that carbon pricing will disproportionally burden the poor and shows that revenue recy-
cling into infrastructure investments could serve for further pro-poor redistribution as well as 
for the compensation of carbon-pricing induced income loss. Due to these positive social im-
pacts, paired with further fiscal and economic co-benefits, the analyzed policy mix could pro-
vide an attractive option for unilateral climate change mitigation in Nigeria. Its potential to 
positively contribute to overall sustainable development, however, depends on the surround-
ing regulatory framework as well as on the institutional capacities and quality of governance 
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A. Literature on Direct and Indirect Distributional Impacts of Carbon Pricing 
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B. Matching Table of Household Consumption Items with MRIO Sectors 
Household Consumption Items 
 (Variable item_cd; (NBS 2011)  
MRIO Sectors* 






p_c Petroleum, coal products fossil fuels direct 
303 Gas (for lighting/cooking)   
304 Other liquid cooking fuel   
308 Charcoal   
309 Petrol   
310 Diesel   
303 Gas (for lighting/cooking) gdt Gas manufacture    
305 Electricity including electricity vouchers ely Electricity electricity 
13  Rice-local  





14  Rice-Imported 
10  Guinea Corn/Sorghum 
gro Cereal grains nec 11  Millet  
12  Maize  
43 Groundnuts  
v_f Vegetables, fruit, nuts 
44 Other nuts/seeds/pulses 
60  Bananas  
61  Orange/tangerine 
62  Mangoes  
63  Avocado pear 
64  Pineapples  
65  Canned  
66  Other fruits 
70  Tomatoes  
72  Onions  
73  Garden eggs/egg plant 
74  Okra-fresh  
76  Pepper  
77  Vegetable leaves (Cocoyam, Spinach, etc) 
78  Other vegetables (fresh or canned) 
110  Fresh milk  
mil Dairy products 
111  Milk powder 
112  Baby milk powder 
113  Milk tinned (unsweetend) 
114  Other milk products 
40 Soya beans 
 osd Oil seeds 41 Brown beans
42 White beans 
30  Cassava-Roots 
ocr Crops nec 
31  Yam-roots 
 32  Gari-White 
 33  Gari -Yellow
34  Cocoyam 
 35  Plantains 
 36  Sweet Potatoes 
37  Potatoes 
 38  Other roots and tuber 
140  Condiments,(salt, spices,pepper,  
80  Chicken 
 
oap Animal products nec 
81  Duck 
 82  Other domestic poultry 
83  Agricultural eggs 
84  Local eggs 





Household Consumption Items 
 (Variable item_cd; (NBS 2011)  
MRIO Sectors* 




90  Beef 
 
cmt Bovine meat products 





93  Goat 
 94  Wild game meat 
95  Canned beef/corned beef 
96  Other meat (excl. poultry) 
92 Pork 
 
omt Meat products nec 
50 Palm oil 
 
vol Vegetable oils and fats 
51 Butter/Margarine 
52 Groundnut oil 
53 Other oils and fats 






ofd Food products nec 
16 Maize 
flour  17 Yam flour 
 18 Cassava flour 
19 Wheat 
flour  20 Other grains and flour 
71 Tomatoes puree(canned) 
75 Okra-dried 
 100 Fish-Fresh 
 101 Fish-
Frozen  102 ish-Smoked
103 Fish-Dried 
 104 Snails 
 105 Seafood (lobster, crab, prawns) 
106 Canned fish/seafood 
107 Other fish or seafood 
131 Jams 




Beverages and tobacco 
products 
121 Chocolate drinks ( 
122 Tea 
 150 Bottled water 
151 Sachet water 
152 Malt 
drinks  153 Soft drinks (Coca cola, spirit etc) 
154 Fruit juice canned 
155 Other Non-acoholic drinks 
160 Beer (local and imported) 
161 Palm wine 
 162 Pito 
 163 Gin 
 164 Other alcoholic beverages 
1101 Cigarettes or tobacco 
411 Ankara, george materials 
tex Textiles 
other 
412 Other clothing materials 
501 Carpets, rugs, drapes, curtains 
502 Linen - towels, sheets, blankets 
503 Mat - sleeping or for drying maize flour 
504 Mosquito net 
505 Mattress 
 401 Infant clothing 
wap Wearing apparel 
402 Baby nappies/diapers 
403 Boys tailored clothes 
404 Boys dress (ready made) 
405 Girls tailored clothes 
VIII 
 
Household Consumption Items 
 (Variable item_cd; (NBS 2011)  
MRIO Sectors* 




406 Girls dress (ready made) 
407 Men tailored clothes in
d
irect 
408 Men dress (ready made) 
409 Women tailored clothes 
410 Women dress (ready made) 
413 Boy's 
shoes  
lea Leather products 
414 Men's shoes 
415 Girl's 
shoes  416 Lady shoes 
 307 Firewood 
 
lum Wood products 
314 Toilet 
paper  
ppp Paper products, publish-ing 
 
426 Books (not for school)  
313 Soap and washing powder 
crp Chemical, rubber, plas-tic products 
 
315 Personal care goods (razor blades, cosmet-
ics) 
 
316 Vitamin supplement  
317 Insecticides, disinfectant an cleaners  
311 Light bulbs/globes 
ome Machinery and equip-ment nec 
 
419 Bowls, glassware, plates, silverware etc  
420 Cooking utensils (cookpots, stirring spoons 
and wisks etc 
 
421 Cleaning utensils (broom, brushes etc)  
422 Torch/flashlight  
423 Umbrella and raincoat  
425 Stationery items (not for school)  
312 Water 
 
wtr Water  
323 Motor vehicle service repair or parts 
trd Trade 
 
324 Bicycle service repair or parts  
428 Night's lodging in rest house or hotel  
327 Repairs & maintenance to dwelling  
318 Postal (incl. stamps, courier) 
cmn Communication 
 
319 Recharge cards  
320 Landline charges  
321 Internet services  
322 Recreational (cinemas, video/dvd rental) 
ros Recreational & services  
325 Wages paid to staff/maid/lawnsboy  
1104 Public transport (bus, rail, boat, etc) otp Transport nec public transport  




C. GTAP Detailed Sectoral List 
Number Code Description* 
1 pdr Paddy Rice: rice, husked and unhusked 
2 wht Wheat: wheat and meslin 
3 gro Other Grains: maize (corn), barley, rye, oats, other cereals 
4 v_f Veg & Fruit: vegetables, fruitvegetables, fruit and nuts, potatoes, cassava, truffles, 
5 osd Oil Seeds: oil seeds and oleaginous fruit; soy beans, copra 
6 c_b Cane & Beet: sugar cane and sugar beet 
7 pfb Plant Fibres: cotton, flax, hemp, sisal and other raw vegetable materials used in textiles 
8 ocr Other Crops: live plants; cut flowers and flower buds; flower seeds and fruit seeds; vege-
table seeds, beverage and spice crops, unmanufactured tobacco, cereal straw and husks, 
unprepared, whether or not chopped, ground, pressed or in the form of pellets; swedes, 
mangolds, fodder roots, hay, lucerne (alfalfa), clover, sainfoin, forage kale, lupines, 
vetches and similar forage products, whether or not in the form of pellets, plants and parts 
of plants used primarily in perfumery, in pharmacy, or for insecticidal, fungicidal or simi-
lar purposes, sugar beet seed and seeds of forage plants, other raw vegetable materials 
9 ctl Cattle: cattle, sheep, goats, horses, asses, mules, and hinnies; and semen thereof 
10 oap Other Animal Products: swine, poultry and other live animals; eggs, in shell (fresh or 
cooked), natural honey, snails (fresh or preserved) except sea snails; frogs' legs, edible 
products of animal origin n.e.c., hides, skins and furskins, raw , insect waxes and sperma-
ceti, whether or not refined or coloured 
11 rmk Raw milk 
12 wol Wool: wool, silk, and other raw animal materials used in textile 
13 frs Forestry: forestry, logging and related service activities 
14 fsh Fishing: hunting, trapping and game propagation including related service activities, fish-
ing, fish farms; service activities incidental to fishing 
15 coa Coal: mining and agglomeration of hard coal, lignite and peat 
16 oil Oil: extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas (part), service activities incidental to 
oil and gas extraction excluding surveying (part) 
17 gas Gas: extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas (part), service activities incidental to 
oil and gas extraction excluding surveying (part) 
18 omn Other Mining: mining of metal ores, uranium, gems. other mining and quarrying 
19 cmt Cattle Meat: fresh or chilled meat and edible offal of cattle, sheep, goats, horses, asses, 
mules, and hinnies. raw fats or grease from any animal or bird. 
20 omt Other Meat: pig meat and offal. preserves and preparations of meat, meat offal or blood, 
flours, meals and pellets of meat or inedible meat offal; greaves 
21 vol Vegetable Oils: crude and refined oils of soya-bean, maize (corn),olive, sesame, ground-
nut, olive, sunflower-seed, safflower, cotton-seed, rape, colza and canola, mustard, coco-
nut palm, palm kernel, castor, tung jojoba, babassu and linseed, perhaps partly or wholly 
hydrogenated,inter-esterified, re-esterified or elaidinised. Also margarine and similar 
preparations, animal or vegetable waxes, fats and oils and their fractions, cotton linters, 
oil-cake and other solid residues resulting from the extraction of vegetable fats or oils; 
flours and meals of oil seeds or oleaginous fruits, except those of mustard; degras and 
other residues resulting from the treatment of fatty substances or animal or vegetable 
waxes. 
22 mil Milk: dairy products 
23 pcr Processed Rice: rice, semi- or wholly milled 
24 sgr Sugar 
25 ofd Other Food: prepared and preserved fish or vegetables, fruit juices and vegetable juices, 
prepared and preserved fruit and nuts, all cereal flours, groats, meal and pellets of wheat, 
cereal groats, meal and pellets n.e.c., other cereal grain products (including corn flakes), 
other vegetable flours and meals, mixes and doughs for the preparation of bakers' wares, 
starches and starch products; sugars and sugar syrups n.e.c., preparations used in animal 
feeding, bakery products, cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery, macaroni, noodles, 
X 
 
Number Code Description* 
couscous and similar farinaceous products, food products n.e.c. 
26 b_t Beverages and Tobacco products 
27 tex Textiles: textiles and man-made fibres 
28 wap Wearing Apparel: Clothing, dressing and dyeing of fur 
29 lea Leather: tanning and dressing of leather; luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and foot-
wear 
30 lum Lumber: wood and products of wood and cork, except furniture; articles of straw and 
plaiting materials 
31 ppp Paper & Paper Products: includes publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded me-
dia 
32 p_c Petroleum & Coke: coke oven products, refined petroleum products, processing of nucle-
ar fuel 
33 crp Chemical Rubber Products: basic chemicals, other chemical products, rubber and plastics 
products 
34 nmm Non-Metallic Minerals: cement, plaster, lime, gravel, concrete 
35 i_s Iron & Steel: basic production and casting 
36 nfm Non-Ferrous Metals: production and casting of copper, aluminium, zinc, lead, gold, and 
silver 
37 fmp Fabricated Metal Products: Sheet metal products, but not machinery and equipment 
38 mvh Motor Motor vehicles and parts: cars, lorries, trailers and semi-trailers 
39 otn Other Transport Equipment: Manufacture of other transport equipment 
40 ele Electronic Equipment: office, accounting and computing machinery, radio, television and 
communication equipment and apparatus 
41 ome Other Machinery & Equipment: electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c., medical, preci-
sion and optical instruments, watches and clocks 
42 omf Other Manufacturing: includes recycling 
43 ely Electricity: production, collection and distribution 
44 gdt Gas Distribution: distribution of gaseous fuels through mains; steam and hot water supply 
45 wtr Water: collection, purification and distribution 
46 cns Construction: building houses factories offices and roads 
47 trd Trade: all retail sales; wholesale trade and commission trade; hotels and restaurants; re-
pairs of motor vehicles and personal and household goods; retail sale of automotive fuel 
48 otp Other Transport: road, rail ; pipelines, auxiliary transport activities; travel agencies 
49 wtp Water transport 
50 atp Air transport 
51 cmn Communications: post and telecommunications 
52 ofi Other Financial Intermediation: includes auxiliary activities but not insurance and pen-
sion funding (see next) 
53 isr Insurance: includes pension funding, except compulsory social security 
54 obs Other Business Services: real estate, renting and business activities 
55 ros Recreation & Other Services: recreational, cultural and sporting activities, other service 
activities; private households with employed persons (servants) 
56 osg Other Services (Government): public administration and defense; compulsory social secu-
rity, education, health and social work, sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar 
activities, activities of membership organizations n.e.c., extra-territorial organizations and 
bodies 
57 dwe Dwellings: ownership of dwellings (imputed rents of houses occupied by owners) 
* Grey sectors were not matched and are not included in Appendix B. 




D. Digital Appendix: Data and Calculations 
Name of File/Folder Description 
Household Survey Data  
Folder contains the original 2010/2011 survey data 
for post planting and post harvest as provided by 
NBS (2011), in STATA data file format. 
GTAP_CO2_gesamt5000.dta 
STATA data file contains a matrix of CO2 emission 
intensities (tCO2/NGN) for all 57 GTAP sectors in 
Nigeria, based on GTAP 9.0 (Narayanan, Aguiar, 
and McDougall 2015), and all 5,000 household 
observations, identified by a household ID.  
Stata_Code_Dorband.do 
STATA do-file contains the entire code for the data 
preparation and analysis, referring to the original 
NBS data as well as the data file based on GTAP. 
Stata_Output_Dorband.pdf 
File contains the STATA output, i.e. the code to-
gether with the results from running the code in 
STATA. 
Calculations_Graphs_Dorband.excel 
File contains final calculations based on STATA 
output and graphs for visual presentation in the 
paper, mostly by quintile averages: 
- Descriptive Statistics: Income Quintiles 
- Expenditure Shares of Consumption Categories 
- Carbon Footprints, by Consumption Categories 
- Infrastructure Provision Costs until 2030 
- Carbon Tax Payments until 2030 
- Infrastructure Access Shares 
- Revenue-Cost Comparison 
- Carbon Intensities of Consumption Categories 
- Subsidy Payments and Distribution 
- Direct Energy Consumption by Source (Shares) 
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